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Abstract
Aerial Transportation system is based in a legacy infrastructure that sup-
ports its different functionality separately. There is a tendency to simplify
the infrastructure, increasing its efficiency, technical and monetary.
UAS are perceived by the general public as simplified versions of the con-
ventional aviation because they have not any human flight crew on board.
In fact, they have a flight crew, but this flight crew is placed on ground
adding some complications to the system (e.g: Command & Control link).
Conventional aviation perceives UAS as a source of problems, mainly be-
cause they have no human flight crew on board capable of creating the
situational awareness of the UAS. This lack of situational awareness com-
promises as well the rest of airspace users safety.
This PhD explores the capability of UAS to contribute to the situational
awareness of both the own aircraft (generating navigation data) as to the
situational awareness of the rest of airspace users (generating surveillance
data).
The contribution to the situational awareness of both the own aircraft (nav-
igation data) as well as the rest of airspace users (surveillance) is simulated
assuming UAS communications based on TDMA and at the communication
rates described in the literature.
The simulation scenario has been kept simple with a low communication
rate and a low number of UAS flying in the simulated area.
The results of navigation are in line with the RNP1. The results in surveil-
lance are in line with the 3NM separation but with a refresh rate much
higher. Then, with this proposal, UAS could be considered as contribu-
tors to the situational awareness instead as the problem that destroys the
situational awareness
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Study the past
if you would define the future.
Confucius (551 BC - 478 BC)
1
Civil Aviation Concerns
1.1 Certificated activity
Regulation currently applicable to civil aviation does not contemplate the absence of the
pilot in command on board, reason why UAS could not be operated as conventional
aviation in non restricted airspace. Figure 1.1 shows how the operational use of an
aircraft depends on some certificates that ensure the compliance with some regulation:
• Type certificate who certifies that the aircraft design is safe,
• Airworthiness certificate who certifies that a specific unit of a type of aircraft is
safe for its current operation,
Figure 1.1 shows how these certifications are granted by a certification authority
(e.g: EASA, FAA) following their regulations (see (3), (4), (5), (6)). These regulations
have the objective of guarantee the safety of the aircraft (see (7)) or aeronautical parts
based on the fulfilment of some standards or methods equivalents to those standards.
These recognised standards are, usually, object of an agreement among the different
actors related with the subject of the standard (see (8), (9) and (10)) e.g: the design of
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Figure 1.1: Aeronautical Standard lyfe cycle
an aircraft, a part, a safety analysis, etc. The aviation authorities (e.g: EASA, FAA...)
recognise some of those standards as acceptable means of compliance (AMC) , enabling
the acquisition of a certificate by the fulfilment of the standard. In fact, this recognition
transform the standard in the only mean for certificate viable in the industry because
the alternative way recognised by the authorities is to show equivalence to the standard
(equivalence that could be hard to demonstrate).
The implication of standards on future developments makes the creation of a stan-
dard an arduous negotiation (see (11), (10)) among the involved actors, often with
conflicting interests. The agreed standards usually reflects previous experiences of the
involved actors that has satisfactory results; they reflect the more usual way of solving
the common problems.
The application of safety to the a generic product development life cycle is analysed
in (12). It is specially interesting how in the initial phase describes the documentation
of risks and the requirement of a safety policy when in final phases it is described the
collection of safety data from the safety test as well as from the user experience.
In aeronautical systems, safety is paramount in design. The requirement of safety
based design is regulated and compliance with this regulation is recognised through
the type certificate. EASA states in (13) the requirement for considering the risks
associated to systems and proposes (1) as an acceptable mean of compliance. (1)
describes the development life cycle for highly integrated systems, describing also the
2
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processes that survey the integrity of the development (a.k.a. integral processes) and
citing the relation with a safety process which is defined in (14).
This logical relation between certification, standards, previous experience and op-
erational use creates a virtuous circle that takes advantage of the experience available.
Nevertheless this circle becomes a vicious circle when the lack of previous experience
flying UAS in civil environments impedes the creation of the standards required for
the certification that shall obtain each aircraft before its operational use. Currently
there are big efforts in achieving some interim standards (see (15)) that will constitute
the essential regulatory toolbox that permits the achievement of operational experience
required for publishing definitive standards.
Figure 1.2 from (1, p. 32) summarizes the relation between the development pro-
cesses described in (1, p. 32) and the safety assessments described in (14).It could be
appreciated how the aircraft level requirement are refined into more detailed require-
ment up to arrive to the system implementation in a five steps process. The second step
(”Allocation Aircraft Functions to Systems”) divides the responsibility of an aircraft
function between the human flight crew and the system supporting the functionality.
The fact of having the human displaced from the cabin could difficult the assignment
to the humans of some responsibility. E.g: See & Avoid, which is usually performed by
human crew in conventional aviation
The design of a certifiable part or component of an aircraft starts at a high level of
abstraction with the definition of the aircraft functions. These functions must describe
the intended operations of the aircraft, the type of aircraft and the basic functionalities
offered by the aircraft(16).
Fig. 1.3 shows some functions implemented by any aircraft capable to operate
in civil airspace: The capacity of see other aircraft, detect collision trajectory, avoid
collision...
Once the criticality of the aircraft functions are established those are divided into
flight procedures to be performed by the flight crew (and must be detailed in the flight
manual), and requirements for the systems (both functional and Safety related).
Fig. 1.4 shows how this separation could simplify the aircraft systems by increasing
the complexity of the flight procedures on the airplane of the left or simplify the flight
procedures of the flight crew by increasing the responsibility assumed by the systems
onboard on the UAS on the right. This is a key point in the development of systems
3
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Figure 1.2: Safety Considerations in aeronautical design from ref. (1)
for UAS because there are some aircraft functions historically performed by the flight
crew on board that could not be performed by flight crew on a UAS, just because flight
crew are not longer on board e.g: Sense & Avoid, Command & control (C&C) and
telemetry datalinks.
With the requirements allocated to the systems, those are developed following the
recommendations (usually including several standards that have been agreed) of the
certification authorities.
Fig. 1.5 shows how the adequacy of the design to the recommendations is recognized
by the authorities with a Type certificate. An aircraft produced accordingly to this
certificate could obtain its airworthiness certificate that serves to grant the access to
the airspace. Here appears the problem of the lack of standards to certify the new
systems appeared in the separation between system requirements and flight procedures
(e.g: sense & avoid, Command & control and telemetry datalinks).
4
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Figure 1.3: Some Aircraft Functions
ATM functions are currently evolving to a more integrated scenario with the exam-
ples of the European SESAR program (17), (18) and the American NextGen (19). In
the European case, the different countries in Europe are also in a process of integra-
tion of the different airspaces (until now depending on each country) named European
Single Sky based on the following regulation:
• The framework Regulation (20),
• service provision (21),
• Airspace regulation(22),
• Interoperability (23)
Some aspects of the aviation have been already unified (e.g: type certificates for
aircraft, thanks to EASA (4)) but some other still remains under the responsibility of
different states (e.g: Radionavigation aids certification)
In November 2007 (24), EASA published a NPA in which stated its aim to assume
at medium or long term the certification of Air Traffic Management Services, including
in this consideration the CNS systems.
1.2 Current CNS
The Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) allows the airspace integration providing
its air Traffic Management Services (ATM). Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) has three
main functionalities to perform its duty:
5
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Figure 1.4: Aircraft Functions assignment
• Communication
• Navigation
• Surveillance
The use of radio signals for navigation or surveillance has been a constant along
the history of aviation; (25) offers a historical overview of the beginnings of the radio
navigation.
Those radio signals must comply with a set of standards in order to provide an ac-
curate navigation and surveillance. As the radio signals are used to provide positioning
services for the aircraft and for the ANSPs, before authorising its use, their performance
shall be verified with a flight inspection. The performance to be achieved by the signal
is described in the country flight inspection manual: Spanish ANSP AENA Radio Nav-
igation aids flight inspection manual (26), USA flight inspection manual (27). These
performances are coordinated at international level by the ICAO which periodically
evolutes its flight inspection manual (28).
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Figure 1.5: Aircraft Airworthiness obtention
Flight inspection is performed with conventional aircraft conveniently equipped with
instruments that captures the radio signals and analyses its performance. Nevertheless,
there is some interest in the flight inspection community to use UAS as platforms for
flight inspection as a method to decrease the cost of the flight inspections. (29) describes
the use of a remotely controlled flight inspection system for the calibration of enroute
facilities. (30) cites UAS as one of the trends that could affect the flight inspection in
the future.
These functionalities are implemented in system whose technology was developed
decades ago, before the deployment of digital telecommunications. The use of the
radiofrequency spectrum made by these systems is mainly analogical and each system
supports exclusively one functionality. E.g:
• Radar provides surveillance.
• VOR and DME provides navigation.
7
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• VHF provides communication.
Figure 1.6: Independence among legacy CNS technologies
Figure 1.6, symbolizes the independence among CNS functionalities as well as
among the system and technologies that implements the functionalities.
1.2.1 Communication
Communications employed by ATCos and ATCOs are, mainly, analogical voice com-
munications over different frequencies (VHF and HF).
The analogical nature of the voice transmission makes those communications spe-
cially vulnerable, both against intended and unintended interferences for the current
8
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human interlocutors but when trying to adapt to the UAS (Unmanned Aerial System)
communications the interpretations of the analogical transmission as orders becomes a
problem of Natural Language interpretation with all the associated complications.
Figure 1.7: OSI Model, H. Ziemmermann
The OSI model (31) is broadly known in telematics communications. Figure 1.7
shows the decomposition in levels from the application layer at the top of the model
until the physical layer at the bottom of the model.
ICAO promulgates norms and recommended methods to ensure the interoperability
of the aircraft at world level. The aeronautical application layer is defined as communi-
cation protocols in (32). The systems implementing the OSI tower are specified in (33).
Finally, the radiofrequency spectrum (physical layer) to be employed are compiled in
(34)
The architecture employed for the implementation of the communication function
depends closely on the kind of missions envisaged with the aircraft in their concept of
operations (CONOPS). The requirement of being able to operate in BLOS conditions
requires communication means quite different that the employed in VLOS conditions.
The acceptable communications implementations for a UAS with an operating range
of 200 NM will be completely different than the acceptable for a UAS with a range of
10.000 NM; being both UAS in BLOS conditions one could rely in ground infrastructure
and the other must require satellite communications.
In (35) is shown how different operational ranges (VLOS and BLOS) are required
9
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and different architectures are proposed using different means (direct communications,
terrestrial datalinks, satellite communications...etc)
Improvement of communications is not a UAS exclusive problem. Is rather a
transversal activity through the aviation. Some of the envisaged improvements of both
SESAR(36), (17) and NEXTGEN (19) programs require characteristics that could not
be found in the current communications.
In conventional aviation, there are different sources of information (radar surveil-
lance, flight plans, meteorology, capacity...etc) that are employed differently by each
actor (airlines, airports, ANSP, pilots, ground personnels...etc). currently, these com-
munication needs are solved separately for each pair producer-consumer (see (37)).
These telecommunications improvements could be grouped in the concept SWIM
(System Wide Information Management) that groups the different producers of aero-
nautical information (meteorology, airlines ...etc) feeding the same information system.
This way, consumers could access to a single information system where they can found
whatever they need in function of its user profile that allows an automated and struc-
tured exploitation.
This approach is shared between FAA and Eurocontrol (see (37) and (38)), reason
why any new communication requirement in aeronautics shall be contemplated under
the prism of future SWIM.
The future interoperability as been studied jointly by the main actors of the global
Air Transportation System. (39) summarizes the recommendations of Eurocontrol and
the FAA for the Future Communications, assessing aspects as the Spectrum bands for
new systems or identifying the communication roadmap.
A more updated general overview of the current aeronautical communications (mainly
based in voice communications), as well as the envisaged (mainly Datalinks) to cope
with the frequency depletion is offered at (40).
The compatibility of the legacy aeronautical infrastructure in L-Band (e.g: DME,
TACAN) with the envisaged physical layer for the aeronautical data-link (L-DACS1)
has been evaluated in (41). The proposed combination of Orthogonal Frequency Di-
vision Multiple Access (OFDMA) and Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) shows
an absence of interference problems.
The envisaged Medium Access to the physical layers requires a clock synchronization
among the data-link users that is directly related with the performances of such data-
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links. Synchronism mechanisms for the clock are not considered in this study assuming
accuracies in line with existing technologies, see (42). Synchronism precision of COTS
(Common Off The Shelf) devices varies among a deviation from UTC of 5ns for time
reference stations, 20ns for rackeable devices and 100ns for computer cards available in
the most common embedded forms as VME or PCI .
1.2.2 Navigation
The aircraft navigation is based on the use of analogical radiofrequency emissions sent
from known positions (the radio navigation aids) and the interpretation of the emission
on board (flight instruments). These radio navigation aids are specified by ICAO in
(43) for ensuring the interoperability of the systems across the globe.
Legacy Navigation The classical navigation based on radio navigation aids is based
on a point to point trajectory where each point is a Radio Navigation Aid. The navaids
commonly employed in this kind of navigation are:
• VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR). the difference between two modulations of
the signal indicates the angle between the north and the line that contains both
the radionavigation aid and the aircraft.
• Distance Measurement Equipment (DME). The period of time elapsed between
the emission from the aircraft of a train of impulses and the reception of the
answer emitted by the radionavigation aid is employed to calculate the distance
between aircraft and navaid.
• Non Directional Beacon (NDB). The Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) shows
the direction from the aircraft where can be found the NDB emitter.
• Instrument Landing System (ILS). The difference in the modulation allows the
identification of the alignment with the runway and with the glide slope.
These navaids could be interpreted with analogical instruments, presenting an ad-
vantage at the deployment decades ago. Today the use they made of the radiofrequency
spectrum could be interpreted as inefficient from the point of view of the air transport
system. From an aircraft designer, each technology requires a dedicated equipment
11
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with its own antenna on the fuselage. In terms of weight, consumption or electromag-
netic compatibility this multiplicity of equipments represents additional problems to be
solved during the design.
RNAV and RNP The large amount of Navigation systems at today’s aircraft has
motivated studies about the integration and fusion of different navigation sources as
(44) where different architectures providing Navigation solution are evaluated. These
architectures take advantage of the redundancy of legacy Navigation sources (INS,
GPS) for providing Fault Tolerance Information.
The prospective of the Navigation includes some advanced operational concepts de-
rived from the integration of the CNS as the Cockpit Display of Traffic Information
(CDTI) Enabled Delegated Separation. (45) states the results of the MITRE Corpora-
tion Center for Advanced Aviation System Development Human in the Loop Study of
CDTI Enabled Delegated Separation which is based on the availability in the cockpit
of the surrounding traffic information.
Table 1.1: Required Navigation Accuracy Values (in NM)
Flight Phase
En Route Arrival Approach Departure
Navigation Oceanic Continental Initial, Final
Spec. remote Intermediate,
Missed
RNAV 10 10
RNAV 5 5 5
RNAV 2 2 2 2
RNAV 1 1 1 1 1
RNP 4 4
Basic-RNP 1 1 1 1
RNP APCH 1 0.3
Independently of the Navigation source (legacy, new system, integration...) a com-
mon agreement of the navigation accuracy shall to be fulfilled to guarantee the safety
of the operations. ICAO stated in its Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) manual
(46) the performance requirements for the different phases of Flight, which are ap-
plicable for aircrafts, airspace and navigation services. RNP improves RNAV adding
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other performances than accuracy e.g: Integrity. A newer version of the document (47)
updates the required values. Table 1.1 summarizes the accuracies, in NM, that must
be fulfilled the 95 % (2σ) of the time. ICAO states that the error in positioning shall
be decomposed into along track error eat (advance or delay) and cross track error ect
(besides the trajectory)(see appendix E).
RNAV and RNP presents a more flexible approach where the definition of way-
points permits its location arbitrarily, without the need to be co-located with a navaid.
Additionally, more flexible trajectories are possible.
The most employed navaid for RNAV an RNP is the GNSS who gives position-
ing information all over the globe with enough accuracy to achieve the strongest area
specification. Nevertheless, the low SNR (Signal to Noise Ratio) at the GNSS re-
ceivers makes them vulnerable. The vulnerability of GNSS is assessed by the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center in (48), where is analysed the vulnerability of
the transport system (aerial, maritime, ground and river) in USA. The signal of the
GPS is analysed and how augmentation systems provides a valuable information of
integrity but do not solve the vulnerability weakness against interference, spoofing or
jamming. Among the conclusions can be found the recommendation of keeping backup
systems and to impose the formation on these systems to the flight Crews.
The vulnerability of the satellite positioning systems is also evaluated by Euro-
control in (49) to discard the decommissioning of existing navigation infrastructure
as the existing infrastructure presents a lower susceptibility. The low susceptibility of
datalinks, provided by features as anti-spoofing or anti-jamming, makes datalinks an
interesting candidate to act as backup for satellite navigation systems.
The integrity of GNSS is partially provided by Satellite based Augmentation Sys-
tems (SBAS) as EGNOS which can alert of large scale unavailability of GNSS. The
European Space Agency announced the availability of the open service in (50) and
later on the availability of the SoL (Safety of Live) dependant services in (51).
The mentioned impact of the GNSS susceptibility could be appreciated in the Eu-
rocontrol road map civil/military (52), in which part of the navigation infrastructure
is kept beyond 2020. In figure 1.8 could be observed how the deployment of new
navigation infrastructure do not imply the decommissioning of current systems.
In spite of the large amount of advantages provided by SBAS systems, still remains
vulnerabilities at small scale as intended or unintended jamming caused by electronic
13
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Figure 1.8: Roadmap for Navigation infrastructure, EUROCONTROL
devices (53). These vulnerabilities precluded the use of GNSS as only navigation mean,
requiring a secondary navigation mean for support in case of anomalous functioning of
the GNSS.
Relative Navigation Using TDMA in the digital communications required by the
UAS, the distances between the emitter and the receiver could be measured thank to
the ToF (Time of Flight) of the messages, which are emitted from known positions.
Figure 1.9 shows how is calculated the position of the aircraft using the ToF of the
messages received from different locations.
This technique is known as Relative Navigation (RelNav) by the military which
implement it in they tactical Datalinks. Those datalinks employed by military are
designed to be employed in hostile scenarios with features as anti-spoofing protection
and anti-jamming. These features decrease the vulnerability of the systems, which is
one of the weak point of satellite based systems (48).
1.2.3 Surveillance
ICAO defines in (54) the different technologies employed in surveillance for ensuring
the interoperability or aircraft and surveillance systems across the globe.
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Figure 1.9: Relative Navigation on Tactical Datalinks
Radar Current surveillance services are based on the Primary Surveillance Radar
(PSR) and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). Both technologies have the same
base: a directional antenna sends a pulse of electromagnetic energy that impacts at
the aircraft emitting an echo that is captured by the radar antenna. The radar system
employs the time elapsed between the emission of the pulse until its reception to calcu-
late the distance separating the antenna and the aircraft. Thanks to this distance and
the orientation of the antenna, could be obtained the position in polar coordinates of
the aircraft.
The fundamental difference between PSR and SSR is the employment of a transpon-
der in SSR to increment the Signal Noise Ratio of the echo. A specific AMC for the
transponder could be found in (55). Thanks to the collaborative nature of the civil
airspace users, the system becomes more precise and reduces the spurious detections.
ADS Even with the simplification that the use of transponders on board brings to
the radar installations, the mechanical complexity (moving parts associated to the an-
tenna) and the location restrictions (requires straight line of sight between aircraft and
antenna) motivates big costs. In (52) different technologies (e.g: Automatic Dependent
Surveillance, Multilateration) are being considered as alternatives for the future that
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could reduce these costs.
The high cost of the conventional SSR hardware and the difficulties to apply radar
technologies to some unpopulated areas, as the mountain canons in Alaska motivate the
development of a different surveillance technology: the Automatic Dependant Surveil-
lance. The ADS-B (Broadcast) concept is based in a datalink that transmits the own
aircraft position (ADS-OUT). It is very often associated to the transponder using its
capability to operate in mode S (56) to transmit the position.
The aircraft could receive the position of the aircraft in the neighbourhood if the
aircraft is adequately equipped (ADS-IN). This information could be broadcast directly
between aircraft or (in ADS-C) could be collected by a central processing facility that
integrates the information and sends a consolidated image through a Traffic Information
Service (TIS-B) (57).
Figure 1.10: Multistatic detection principles, ICAO
Multilateration Multilateration is based in the use of omnidirectional antennae in-
stead of the directional antennae of the primary and secondary radar systems. Figure
1.10 shows hows the omnidirectional antennae sends a signal and receives the echo of
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the own signal as well as the echo of the rest of emitter antennae. With the time of
emission of a signal and its time of reception at another antenna could be calculated the
hyperbole where the aircraft is located. Different pairs of emitter-receivers produces
different hyperboles that constitutes a system of equations that serves to calculate the
position of the aircraft. With this technique, the sensor is not longer a directional
antenna and becomes a network of antennae incrementing the resilience of the system
thanks to the capacity of add a new node, remove a node or move a node from a location
to another.
The ICAO communication panel has evaluated its viability in (58) as well as dutch
NLR in (59).
An operational example of employment of multilateration could be found in the
deployment program for RVSM in Europe (60) where was employed to monitory the
flight altitude of the aircraft.
The correlation of the DME impulses received at different location for its use with
multilateration purposes has been explored in (61).
Required Surveillance Performance The performance to be required to a surveil-
lance system includes different aspects of the system behaviour: rotation period of
the radar antennae, latency between sensor acquisition and display, position accuracy,
availability continuity... etc.
This work will focus on the required position accuracy taking two references: the
Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and EUROCON-
TROL.
The Lincoln Laboratory analyses the Required Surveillance Performance (RSP) ac-
curacy for support the separation of 3-Mile and 5-Mile in (62). Using a reference system
approach simulates the accuracy to be retrieved from the radar currently available in
the USA and validates these simulations with actual flight tests.
EUROCONTROL states in (63) the Surveillance performance to be required at any
surveillance system that support the air traffic management.
Table 1.2 summarizes the indicators retained for the analysis in both 3-mile and
5-Mile separation spaces from both Lincoln Laboratories and EUROCONTROL. The
Lincoln Laboratory requires a geographical position accuracy with a σ of less than
0.2NM for the 3NM separation and a σ of less than 1NM for the 5NM separation.
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Table 1.2: Required Surveillance Accuracy Values
Separation Required
3NM 5NM
Geographical Position accuracy (62) σ < 0.20NM (370m) σ < 1NM (1852m)
Horizontal position RMS error (63) < 330m (< 230m) < 550m (< 350m)
This geographical position accuracy shows how much variation or dispersion from the
average are we facing. It includes the error generated by the delay between position
updates originated by the rotational period of the radar antenna, rotational period that
is not present in systems based in omnidirectional antennae as multilateration or ADS.
EUROCONTROL requires a horizontal position error of less than 330m for the
3NM separation (but recommends less than 230m) and less than 550m for the 5NM
separation (but recommends less than 350m). This horizontal position error is a thresh-
old in the distance between the indicated position and the actual position of the track.
This distance in straight line differs from the errors required by ICAO for RNP.
ASTERIX No matter the source of surveillance data, the integration of different
surveillance data sources provides a integrated air traffic picture that increase its re-
silience from the individual sources. It exist a protocol to achieve this integration of
surveillance data named ASTERIX (All Purpose STructured Eurocontrol SuRveillance
Information EXchange)(64).
1.3 Convergent CNS
Conventional CNS means acts isolated; surveillance means performs only surveillance
tasks, navigation means performs only navigation task as well as communication means
only performs communication tasks. There is a tendency to take advantage of the
synergies between communication, navigation and surveillance, making them converge.
The different CNS means are the link between the ground (where ATC is located)
and the air (where the aircraft is located). This link is substantiated by the radiofre-
quency spectrum that the civil aviation has assigned.
The radiofrequency is assigned to its exclusive use in different application to avoid
the interference that different applications could create when accessing simultaneously
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Figure 1.11: Frequency allocations in USA from (2)
to the radiofrequency. Some uses of aviation are defined at international level by ICAO
in (34) to ensure the interoperability of aircraft and systems at international flights.
Nevertheless, each country has sovereignty over its radiofrequency spectrum, as-
signing the rest of the spectrum at his own convenience. As a consequence, there is a
lack of unassigned spectrum that could be employed for UAS. As an example of this
lack of spectrum could be seen in figure 1.11 from (2) which represents the spectrum
assignment in USA. The rest of modern countries has the same problem with minor
changes in some assignments. The absence of unassigned frequencies difficult the de-
ployment of new technologies for CNS (38). One of the strategies to cope with the
lack of unassigned frequency is the shift from analogical to digital communications that
enhances the efficiency of the communications.
UAS have extra demand of radiofrequency as they require additional systems for
remote Command & Control and Sense & Avoid (replacing human See & Avoid).
Eurocae WG-73 on UAS and RTCA SC-203 agrees on the requirement for demanding
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new assignments of radiofrequency for the implementation of these new functionalities
to the ITU, considering this assignment a keystone for the deployment of civil UAS.
In this scenario of lack of assignable frequencies and exigence of new systems re-
quiring radiofrequency, the optimization of the assigned frequencies becomes a catalyst
for the new functionalities.
Figure 1.12: CNS functions Convergence
The current use of radiofrequency by the CNS means enables different synergies
providing CNS support in different aspects convergently such as:
• SSR mode S. The radar interrogation and the transponder response (Surveillance)
could be employed as datalink exchanging information (Communication).
• DME. The pulses sent by the interrogator (Navigation) could be employed on
ground to obtain the position of the aircrafts by multilateration (Surveillance).
• ADF. The emission of a dedicated beacon is employed to locate the direction since
the aircraft (Navigation). It also could be used with conventional radio stations
(communications).
In (65), there are different techniques to obtain CNS information from datalinks.
Eurocontrol has evaluated the use of a specific system called MIDS (Multifunctional
20
1.3 Convergent CNS
Information Distribution System). In (66), Eurocontrol details the result of its study
about the use of MIDS as support for ADS-B. A premise of the study was the employ-
ment of the Euromids to reduce costs thanks to the economy of scale. Nevertheless,
the massive employ of MIDS could create some problems of frequency saturation which
results unacceptable as MIDS is an element of the defence in modern Armies. The
interest of European Armies in the convergent capacities of MIDS as support for the
Civil/military interoperability has its counterpart on USA (67).
Despite the unfavourable result of (66), Eurocontrol considers MIDS as susceptible
of being used in ATM in its Civil-Military CNS/ATM Interoperability Roadmap (52).
This document has as objective to ensure the interoperability of current and future
military and civil CNS systems. This interoperability is reflected on the assumption of
common requirements for Navigation (RNP), Communication (RCP) and Surveillance
(RSP).
Eurocontrol also mentions in (52) the need of rationalization for the CNS infras-
tructure as well as the increasing demand on security aspects that the terrorist menace
imposes.
Figure 1.13: NASA and Eurocontrol recommendations
Nasa performed a technology screening program ((68), (69) and (70)) searching for
candidate technologies for future communications systems. In its document Identifica-
tion of technologies for Provision of Future Aeronautical Communnications ((69)) the
evaluation of Link 16 as candidate technology to support the evolution of CNS means
in aviation, as can be seen in Figure 1.13.
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1.4 Overview
This thesis is divided in seven chapters: Chapter 2 gives an overview of the concerns
for UAS operations. Chapter 3 states the objectives of this thesis. Chapter 4 describes
the positioning methodology employed. Chapter 5 describes the simulation environ-
ment developed for testing the proposal. Chapter 6 analyses the results obtained in
navigation. Chapter 7 analyses the results obtained in surveillance. Chapter 8 presents
the conclusions and future developments.
Some additional information has been placed in 6 annexes: Annex A develops the
linearisation of the measurements equation in order to emploi a linear estimator. Annex
B explains briefly the structure of the extended kalman filter employed. Annex C sum-
marizes some relevant statistical information. Annex D explains the ICAO methodology
employed for computing the confidence level for GBAS, which is the same employed
in our analysis. Annex E describes the error considered by ICAO in navigation (eat
and ect) and how to calculate it. Annex F describes the clock model employed in the
simulations.
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To improve our knowledge
we must learn less
and contemplate more.
Rene´ Des Cartes (1596 - 1650)
2
UAS Concerns
UAS are aircraft without human flight crew on board. A common misunderstanding
about UAS is to consider them as a simplified versions of existing aircraft, just because
are not loaded with people on board. Actually, the concept of UAS goes beyond the
limits of conventional aviation in different aspects; comprises different levels of human
flight crew dependence; requires new systems; support more functionalities and have
more typologies than in conventional aircraft.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) is in fact a misleading acronym. While the the-
oretical concept includes from radio-controlled air models to intelligent self controlled
aerial artefacts, the envisaged regulations limits its autonomy keeping always a man
in the control loop. Other acronyms that better represents this limitation are RPAS
(Remotely Piloted Air System) or ROA (Remotely Operated Aircraft) .
Civil aircraft operations regulation states that the Pilot In Command (PiC) is the
responsible of the safety of the aircraft, the life of the occupants and people in ground.
The absence of human pilot on board has impact on the design of the aircraft being
responsible of the creation of new systems to comply with functionalities performed by
humans in conventional aviation, e.g:
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• Air traffic detection in VFR,
• Remote operation of the Aircraft.
In this chapter some limitations on UAS operations are identified and it is stated
the point of view of main standardization and regulatory bodies
2.1 Access to airspace
There is a broad consensus that UAS civil airspace access shall be obtained with a
safely seamless integration, independently of which mission will be performed in which
airspace type. UAVNET proposes in its roadmap (71) the need of stablish long term
strategic lines in Europe and to stablish an excellence center coordinating the involved
actors in civil UAS research.
Main problem for civil operations of UAS is the lack of regulation ensuring a safety
integration with the rest of airspace users. There are examples of political impulse
as (72) in USA that emphasizes the need of integrate UAS in the airspace, or (73) in
Europe, but the lack of acceptable means to achieve the objective impedes in fact its
accomplishment.
Some examples of an apparently normality in the use of UAS around the globe
could be found in: (74), (75), (76), (77), (78) or (79). Nevertheless, the examples
mentioned are operated as state aircraft. Shall be kept in mind the difference in the
operation between military UAS, where some regulation is already published (see (80)
and (81).) and civil UAS where the regulation applicable to the sate aircraft are no
longer applicable.
Figure 2.1 shows how state aircraft (surrounded by blue dots) are controlled by a
mission dedicated controller. The military controller is the responsible of maintaining
the separation with the rest of airspace users, using military means (surveillance, com-
munications, Navigation) and providing the directives exclusively for the state aircraft.
The problems that the absence of pilot on board could be then solved by controller.
The most usual tool for achieving a UAS operation is to segregate the airspace around
the UAS (impeding the access to the rest of airspace users), which is usual in war en-
vironment, but is not feasible in a civil environment where the UAS shall coexist with
the rest of airspace users.
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Figure 2.1: Military UAS control
State aircraft have applicable regulations both for the UAS itself (80) as well as for
the pilots in command (81). Eurocontrol has already published specific regulations (82)
for the use of state UAS as operational air traffic (OAT) outside segregated airspace.
Figure 2.2 shows how civil controllers are shared by all the users of a section of the
airspace. This approach requires a seamless integration of UAS where the unmanned
or manned nature of the aircraft does not suppose any difference to the controller in
contraposition of military controllers (see fig. 2.1) which could pay special attention to
a UAS.
Figure 2.2: Civil UAS control
The difference between air control performed by civil (figure 2.2) and military con-
trollers (figure 2.1) is that in a civil environment, the controller does not manage a
mission but a section of the airspace and its use by the airspace users (commercial jets,
general aviation, business aviation...).
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Figure 2.3: Experimental Access to Airspace
Figure 2.3 states the different mechanism to allow UAS to access to the USA na-
tional airspace using GSN Goal Structured Notation ((83) and (84)). The lack of UAS
flight experience motivates a recommendation to provide access to airspace. The Reg-
ulatory bodies offer two different mechanisms to allow UAS to access the civil airspace:
• Restricted type certificate with an airworthiness certificate,
• Special Permit to Fly.
FAA developed an additional interim procedure(85) for U.S. Governmental institu-
tions grouping the requirements of:
• Aircraft Certification Service;
– Unmanned Aircraft Program Office (UAPO) (AIR-160);
– Production and Airworthiness Division (AIR-200);
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• Flight Technologies and Procedures Division of the FAA Flight Standards Service
(AFS-400); and
• Air Traffic Organisation Office of System Operations and Safety, (AJR-3).
This procedure describes how to obtain a COA (86) aimed at granting access to UAS
into the U.S. National Airspace. Includes indications on airworthiness, flight operations
and personnel qualifications.
Restricted Type Certificates allows an aircraft produced accordingly to obtain a
Restricted Certificate of Airworthiness which is valid only if the aircraft is operated in
segregated airspace.
EASA proposes to include a statement in the aircraft flight manual limiting the
operations to segregated airspace, unless mitigation measures (e.g: S&A (87)) have
been accepted by the responsible authority granting access to the airspace volume in
which the UAS will operate.
FAA proposes, alternative methods to the conventional compliance of FAR Part 61,
which tackles certification for pilots, flight and ground instructors; and part 91, which
deals with the general operating and flight rules.
In case the aircraft cannot meet the previous certification requirements, but is still
capable to perform a safe flight under defined conditions, a Permit to Fly can also be
granted. This could be the case of the majority of UAS. The eligibility conditions for
a Permit to Fly may be different among countries e.g: Access to European airspace for
UAS under 150 kg of operating mass must be granted by the national authority of the
state in where the UAS will carry on the operations.
Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) published UAS specific regula-
tions in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 101: Unmanned aircraft and
rocket operations limiting the UAS access to airspace only to IFR flights (if conveniently
equipped) unless sufficient visual cues are provided to the UAS pilot.
(88) explains the spiral life cycle of the development of the Global Hawk navigation
system. The developers used a stepped approach for the flight test with the navigation
systems located in a conventional aircraft who flight near the UAS. Thanks to this
separation between the airframe and the navigation systems, the eventual deadlocks of
the navigation system does not implies the destruction of the airframe.
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2.1.1 Certification recommendations
The newness of the UAS motivates an absence of applicable certification recommen-
dations that impedes obtaining a Type Certificate and, consequently, a Certificate of
Airworthiness. The different kinds of UAS and its operation opens the field of technical
solutions to a broad spectrum of partial solutions which will be only acceptable under
specific circumstances. (89) analyses the current framework for the UAS airworthiness
and concludes that the type category alone does not define the UAS airworthiness cat-
egory. It proposes the use of both the system type and the kind of operation to define
the airworthiness in an Airworthiness Certification Matrix (ACM) .
(90) gives an overview of existing regulations and standards on S&A for UAS,
highlighting the current issues and challenges that S&A systems will have to face in a
future regulatory frame.
ICAO has an Study Group dedicated to the UAS: the UASSG . In (91) proposes
to create a circular that must be refined towards a manual. Further development of
SARPs and PANS is envisaged but not yet started.
A Restricted Type Certificate can be granted under defined and limited conditions,
providing that the actual conditions of use are restricted to those in which the Cer-
tification Specification applicability is not compromised. E.g: operations assumed in
segregated airspace justifies the absence of the S&A capability.
Non-governmental UAS developments must obtain a Restricted Airworthiness Cer-
tificate from FAA for its operation in USA following the specific regulations to issue
Experimental Certificates(FAR §21.191).
To operate in airspace a UAS, must comply with the required equipment proving
to be safe to any other user. The use of S&A systems must be accompanied by a safety
case showing its adequacy to the intended airspace. In (86), FAA discards current on-
board cameras or sensors as only mitigation means to comply with the see part of the
S&A requirements because they have not yet shown enough maturity (specially sensing
non-collaborative airspace users)
The European Authority for granting airworthiness & permit to fly is EASA (see
(92)). EASA published in 2009 its certification policy for UAS (87), based on its own
A-NPA of 2005 (93). The publishing date for the AMC for UAS is undefined and EASA
does not envisage working on certificability for UAS before 2014 (94). EASA assumes in
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Figure 2.4: Applicable Regulation
its Policy Statement on Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (87)
that more experience is needed to publish a dedicated Acceptable Mean of Compliance
(AMC) document on UAS. Figure 2.5 shows the proposal of EASA: the interim use of
the existing CS-21 , subpart B (type certificates)(95) modified with some guidance on
special conditions according to the general means (96) to allow the obtention of type
certificate. CS-LUAV CS-UAV 25 UAS with an operating mass below 150 kg, aircraft
explicitly designed for research, experimental or scientific purposes are excluded from
EASA Authority.
The transport Canada Civil Aviation established in(97) a program design working
group aiming to develop different deliverables from 2011 to 2016 concerning, among
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respectively. The values for each version and each scenario are shown in Figures 1 and 2 of 
appendix 1 to attachment 2 to the policy. Although there is a small overlap with CS-VLA in one 
case, it can be seen that the guideline standard is CS-23 for both versions of the aircraft.  
 
Application to StratSat 
StratSat is an unmanned communications airship intended for long duration missions stationed 
above population centres. For this aircraft the “unpremeditated descent” analysis indicates that a 
standard equivalent to CS-23 as applied to single-engine aeroplanes would be appropriate. The “loss 
of control descent” analysis indicates that standards equivalent to a combination of CS-25 and CS-
23 Commuter Category should be applied to reduce the probability of such an event. Thus the basis 
for civil certification of this aircraft should be the airship equivalent of CS-23 supplemented as 
necessary by requirements from CS-25 and CS-23 Commuter. 
 
It is appreciated that no simple method can give a complete answer to the definition of the 
certification basis, and the conventional processes using judgement and debate will still be required. 
However, the method presented provides a useful tool in anticipating the general level of 
airworthiness requirements to be set. Its application is also rather straightforward. 
 
Further information on the ‘Safety Objectives’ method: 
Alternative two is based on a study conducted at the request of the French Civil Aviation Authority 
(NAVDROC study) 
This alternative proposes that UAV safety objectives should take into account: 
• The protection of populations and he today risk encountered by the populations 
• The economics reality to allow a smooth development of the UAV 
• The safety objectives must be consistent with the safety objectives of all today flying 
machines not only the objectives of transport civil aircraft but also the objectives of military aircraft 
as combat aircraft or helicopters. 
 
It also propose to use Certification Specifications (CS) as a guide to define UAV type certification 
basis but advocates that based on safety objectives the mass categories for the CS would have to be 
redefined as suggested by the graph below. 
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Figure 2.5: EASA proposed equivalence of CS
several objectives, S&A technologies.
(90) offers a survey of existing manned and unmanned regulations world-wide, along
with recommendations on UAS integration.
All the existing protocols for flying UAS requires especial attention to S & A em-
phasizing in the use of human observers. Human observers provide see capabilities
but it also provides navigation and surveillance in an integrated picture: situational
awareness.
2.1.2 Standardisation bodies
The Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) accepted by EASA or FAA for aircraft
certification are based on standards produced by organizations as EUROCAE, RTCA,
ARINC, SAE etc. Those organisations constitute working groups, with representation
of the different interests, that works for the adoption of an agreement.
The set of standards that UAS community could use as AMC are currently under
definition process. RTCA in USA and EUROCAE in Europe have working groups
dedicated to discuss the future applicable regulation.
EUROCAE Working Group 73 (WG-73) addressing the standards required for civil-
ian UAS to fly in non-segregated airspace is subdivided in:
• SG-1: operations and sense and avoid (98),
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• SG-2: airworthiness and continued airworthiness (99),
• SG-3: command and control, communications, spectrum & security (C3SS) (100),
• SG-4: UAS below 150 kg for visual line of sight operations (15)..
The light UAS in VLOS operations are seen as the simpler way to accumulate
operational experience
RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC-203) is developing standards for UAS aiming at
helping the safe, efficient and compatible operation of UAS with other vehicles. They
are coordinated with FAA, Eurocae WG73 and Eurocontrol (101).
RTCA Do 320 (102) proposes an initial assessment of the applicability of existing
standards to UAS. For S&A identifies as baseline existing standards on Automatic
Dependent Surveillance (ADS) concepts, Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS),
Traffic Information Systems (TIS), Cockpit Display Traffic Information (CDTI) devices,
etc. RTCA is developing a Minimum Aviation System Performance Standard (MASPS)
for S&A for UAS.
ASTM International Committee F38 on UAS, is devoted to standards including the
design, manufacture, maintenance and operation of UAS, training and qualification of
personnel; is divided into different subcommittees:
• F38.01 Airworthiness Standards
• F38.02 Operations Standards
• F38.03 Pilot & Maintenance Qualifications
ASTM has a standard for the design and performance of UAS S&A systems (103)
stating high-level design requirements.
The different standardization bodies work aligned with the aviation authorities and,
consequently the concerns about the situational awareness appears with the special
dedication to the Sense & Avoid.
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2.2 Operations
2.2.1 Flight extension
A conventional aircraft operation could be represented as a decomposition in phases
of a standard flight: Pre-flight inspection, Taxi, Take off, Climb, Cruise, Approach,
Landing, Taxi, Post-flight inspection.
Those phases summarizes the flight plan, but there is also a previous work for each
flight which could be present or not depending on aspects as the configuration of the
aircraft and the storage of the aircraft. In conventional aviation, these works are not
part of the flight plan and are considered as maintenance tasks or even production
tasks (e.g: an airliner is assembled only once at the start of its operational life). These
previous works could be divided into tactical and strategic phases.
Tactical phases includes: packaging, transport, unpacking, assembly, adequacy, dis-
assembly.
Where: Packaging comprises the compilation of all the required equipment for the
mission. Shall be kept in mind that the distance from the storage to the airfield could
motivate the abortion of a mission in case of lack of some equipment.
Transport comprises the transfer from the home storage to the airfield. Unpacking
comprises the extraction of the equipment from its transport. Assembly comprises the
assembly of the aircraft and associated equipments. Adequacy comprises the organiza-
tion of both material and human crew. Disassembly comprises the disassembly of the
UAS. Those phases are usually avoided by conventional aviation users as the aircraft
are assembled at the factory and remains assembled on the hangar between flights.
The manipulation of the aircraft and its parts beyond its normal use during a flight is
reserved to people and organizations certified with the part-145 and part-M.
There is the exception of some very light aircraft (see (104)) which are designed to
be towed in a trailer by the owner from its home storage to the airfield. Nevertheless,
this towing exception does not contemplate the full spectrum of UAS configurations
that requires some kind of manipulation /assembly before the each flight.
Additionally to the tactical phases, the experimental nature of the UAS flights
motivates an additional set of phases dedicated to the planning of the mission and
obtaining the required authorizations: Operational environment planning, Flight plan
planning, Emergency response planning, Payload planning.
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This eventual reorganization of the flight phases could have some safety considera-
tions as it relocates some activities from a domain (e.g: maintenance) to another (flight
operations) but these are problems that have been already addressed.
2.2.2 Human Crew Roles definition
The responsibilities of the human flight crew are defined in the function assignment
process (see (1)) adopting the responsibilities of the aircraft functions that systems are
not assuming entirely. As explained before, UAS goes beyond the conventional aviation
concept in many aspects. These different aspects motivate the adoption by the flight
crew of some additional roles that came from other aspects of the aviation Operations
chief, Assembly coordinator, Ground Segment Coordinator, Air Segment Coordinator,
Safety Officer.
Operations Chief coordinates the entire mission. In conventional aviations is usually
assigned to the Pilot in Command as he is the ultimate responsible of the aircraft and
the life of its occupants.
Assembly coordinator is a role usually performed in conventional aviation by a
Production Organization that holds a Production Organization Approval or POA (see
ref (105)). Due to the large spectrum of UAS configurations, part of the assembly could
be performed during the mission. E.g: Assembly of the wings and the fuselage that
has been towed in a trailer.
Ground Segment Coordinator comprises responsibilities that are usually performed
by flight crew and also by the ground personnel at airfields. Notably, the role of
ground observer that ensures the separation with the rest of airspace users are usually
performed on board by the flight crew itself in conventional aviation. By the side of
airfields operators, the coordination among the deployed personnel on ground is part
of the responsibilities of the airfield operator.
Air Segment Coordinator is a role usually performed by the Pilot in Command when
airborne. The displacing of the flight crew to the ground enables richest interactions
among different mission actors and could require a skilled coordinator understanding
both the complexities of the mission and the constraints of flying.
Safety Officer is a role usually performed by the Pilot in Command when airborne
as he is the ultimate responsible of the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. The
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flexibility that gives the location of the mission Crew in ground enhances the possi-
bilities of assignments of this role, being possible the assumption to flight crew as in
conventional aviation or find another assignment.
This flexibility applies also to the regulated time of flight for each flight crew. This
time of flight is regulate (e.g: (106)) to maintain at an acceptable level the fatigue of
the flight crew. This limitation requires different flight crew sets for long flights. In
conventional aviation, the different flight crew shall be on board, reducing the cargo
capacity whilst in UAV, the different flight crew are placed on the GS.
The amount of additional roles that could be assumed during a UAS mission difficult
the definition of the flight crew licenses. It is assumed that a UAS pilot shall have a
safety culture but it is not clear the extent of it as well as are not defined the different
kinds of licenses.
2.2.3 Network Architectural Approaches
Communications is considered one of the corner stones for the integration of UAS in
General Air Traffic (GAT). The additional requirements imposed to communications
come from two different circumstances, both derived from the control position split
between ground and air:
• New communications internal to UAS (between UAV and GS)
• Adaptation of UAS to legacy communications (between UAS and ATC)
Communication between UAV and GS are motivated by the split of the control
position between ground station and air vehicle and includes telemetry (UAV to GS)
and control commands (GS to UAV).
The adaptation of UAS to legacy communications are imposed by the integration
in General Air Traffic (GAT) where analogical voice communications are used. Those
analogical means are very flexible in their use by humans, but difficult its automatic
interpretation by UAVs. This interpretation problem and the foreseeable requirement
of a human Pilot in command motivate the redirection of such communications to the
Ground Station.
The new requirements of communications, both motivated by architecture and new
technologies, motivate different architecture depending on the range and the availability
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of infrastructure envisaged for the UAS deployment. The range envisaged for the
deployment could be divided in two:
• Line of Sight (LoS)
• Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)
The infrastructure availability could be translated into the availability of wired net-
works or its absence, in which case the network is usually provided by communications
satellites.
Figure 2.6: RTCA/Eurocontrol proposed RF architecture for LoS operation
Figure 2.6 shows a communications architecture where the UAV receives both voice
and data communications from ATC/ATM through RF and redirects it to the GS
through a different frequency through RF. This configuration makes indifferent to ATC
the fact of managing a UAS or a conventional aircraft. On the other hand the com-
munications are duplicated between ATC and UAV and between UA and GS through
RF.
Figure 2.7 shows a communications architecture where the UAV receives both voice
and data communications from ATC/ATM through RF and redirects it to the GS
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Figure 2.7: RTCA/Eurocontrol proposed satellite architecture for BLoS operation
through a satellite network. This configuration makes indifferent to ATC the fact of
managing a UAS or a conventional aircraft. On the other hand the communications
are duplicated between ATC and UAV through RF and between UA and GS through
satellite network.
These configurations increases the flexibility for UAS deployments in BLOS con-
ditions with the limitations that the Satellite network could impose in terms of data
throughput availability (specially when itinerant) or latency (critical for responses in
critical situations).
Figure 2.8 shows an architecture for remote UAV where the datalinks between UAV
and GS use a satellite network and the communications with ATC and ATM are done
through wired networks infrastructure.
This architecture limits the duplications of communications thanks to the existence
of a ground infrastructure that allows the exchange of communications through the
cable. Thanks to this approach the requirement on satellite data throughput is smaller
than the architecture reflected in Figure 2.7 but limiting its applicability to operations
over wired territories.
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Figure 2.8: RTCA/Eurocontrol proposed wired architecture for BLoS operation
The different comms architectures presented show technical options to fly UAS in
different scenarios. The major problem for the comms is the political assignment of
radio frequency spectrum, which is a very scarce resource.
2.3 Function assignment
Even with the constraint of keeping a pilot in the loop, there is a high interest in avoid
annoyances to the rest of civil airspace users when integrating UAS. This seamless
integration requires the fulfilment of the same high level functions that are already im-
plemented by conventional airspace users with a freshly new architecture that displaces
the flight Crew to the ground.
Figure 2.9 shows a proposal of functions to be implemented by the UAS. Following
the methodology for highly integrated systems of SAE (1), these functionalities shall be
assigned to the UAS systems, to the flight crew or to a combination of both. There is
not any problem for the majority of functionalities as they are currently implemented
in the conventional aircraft.
Nevertheless, problems raise when trying to assign the functionality of See & Avoid
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Figure 2.9: Aircraft functions proposed by NASA for UAS
as NASA proposes in (16). In it is assumed that human crew is responsible of the
flight safety, especially under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) but the situational awareness
capability offered by the flight crew on conventional aircraft is no longer available
in UAS. The assumption of this functionality by the flight crew, which is placed on
ground, could compromise the safety because of the complexity of transmitting the
video information to the ground.
Figure 2.9 shows a proposal of functions to be implemented by the UAS in which the
point 4.1 Avoid Collisions contains the see functionality usually performed by human
flight Crew in conventional aviation. See&Avoid is the capacity of the human crew
to detect and identify other threatening objects or terrain; perform actions to safely
separate from them; or perform evasive manoeuvres to avoid collisions as a last resort
in case of a loss of separation. See&Avoid appears as one required aircraft function
which design shall find the optimal solution for the scenario (mission, airspace, range,
architecture...) dividing the function between flight crew and systems.
Following the methodology for highly integrated systems of SAE (1), this responsi-
bility assumption could be extremely difficult to implement in UAS as the complexity
of transmitting visual information to the PiC on Ground could decrease excessively the
safety margins.
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The principal regulatory bodies agree that, the displacement of the flight crew to
the ground, should be equivalent (in terms of Safety) with respect to manned aviation.
Different methodologies have been proposed to demonstrate this equivalence in the
for-coming UAS regulation:
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Figure 2.10: Equivalent Level of Safety
Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) tries to quantify the risk for human beings of
Conventional aviation and provide the same level of Safety in UAS operations.
Figure 2.10 shows the ELOS concept applied to the S&A. Several interpretations
of this concept has been done in S&A trying to quantify the human performance for
seeing air traffic but the equivalence has not been satisfactorily demonstrated (90).
Target Level of Safety (TLS) specifies the acceptable mean number of collisions per
flight hour which could result in fatalities. Figure 2.11 shows the TLS concept applied
to the S &A. It is noteworthy the absence of the human models that difficult the
adoption of the ELOS concept, nevertheless to show compliance with the target level
of safety is not an easy question when there is not an Acceptable Mean of Compliance
as is the case for the systems in conventional aviation.
For the S&A case, different studies has been produced for analysing the required
performances of the systems implementing such functionality: an interesting model of
the end-to-end system performance is shown in (107); a mid-air collision risk-assessment
is presented in (108). The estimated number of expected collisions per hour of flight
39
2. UAS CONCERNS
Designated Area 
validated for 
intended use
Avoid Air 
traffic 
Interferences
Upper Airspace 
does not interfere
Lower  Airspace 
does not interfere
Operations at BCN 
airport are not 
affeected
UAS does not 
increments risk for 
airspace users
Evidence of 
collision 
safety
Demonstrate 
Target Level 
of Safety
The Vehicle is 
an UAS
Operational 
concept
is defined
Required level of 
Safety definition
Collision risk 
is safe
Evidence of 
vision safety
The vision capability 
is safe
Figure 2.11: Target Level of Safety
could be useful for establishing the minimum performance requirements of S&A systems
in different scenarios.
FAA mention in its Certificate of Approval (COA) (86) procedure the use of external
observers or equivalent means (such as chase planes). The observers shall be located
nearer than 1 NM in the horizontal plane and 3000 ft vertically. Night operations
requires a special Safety Case and precludes the use of observers. As explained before,
observers have the advantage of providing an integrated situational awareness.
From a technical point of view, (108) presents eight different S&A solutions families
grouping by different sense technologies. In (109) some conflict detection and resolution
algorithms that shall provide the avoid functionality are reviewed.
The kind of operations envisaged for the UAS could also determine the develop-
ment of new system to comply with the aircraft functions more specifically with the
navigation functions. Most of envisaged UAS missions are devoted to the territory
monitoring requiring a RNP capability. the most usual source of navigation for RNP
is GNSS capability, nevertheless, GNSS is vulnerable enough as to require a secondary
means of navigation as backup. In conventional aviation this is performed through
the use of legacy systems as DME or VOR but the level of situational awareness pro-
vided by DME & VOR is very limited as they where developed to provide support to
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a system of airway. The performance of legacy systems does not allows its use in most
of the precision mission envisaged for UAS requiring an additional backup system for
precision navigation.
(110) offers an overview of the system assurance process that the British Royal
Air Force (RAF) employ in the Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) . Regarding
navigation, it states that a navigation solution based in GPS as only navigation mean is
insufficient and additional navigation means shall be incorporated to the RPAS design.
The specificity of some kinds of UAS could bring to new requirements for already
existing systems e.g: the ATC transponder. In conventional aviation, the size of the
aircraft allows them to be detected by primary Radars. The small size of some UAS, and
consequently its small radar cross section, could difficult its detection by primary radar.
This difficulty could be seen as a security problem in the case of intentional absence of
ATC transponder on board, but there is also a safety problem as the PSR detection
capability could no more be presented as a backup to comply with the certification
requirements of the transponder. Additionally, a failure of the SSR transponder affects
not only the safety of the UAS, it also affects the situational awareness of the rest of
airspace users, reducing their safety levels.
The users of the airspace maintains a separation minima to ensure the safety of
flight. Figure 2.12 shows different mechanisms employed to ensure the separation.
Any of the presented mechanisms requires a situational awareness in the time scale of
the mechanism. While Procedural Separation requires several minutes to ensure the
separation, Non-Cooperative Collision Avoidance acts in few seconds.
Non-cooperative 
Collision avoidance
Cooperative 
Collision 
avoidance
Self 
Separation
Traffic 
Management
Procedural
On Board Outside Aircraft
Figure 2.12: Separation and Collision Avoidance Mechanisms in conventional aircraft
Procedural separation requires the knowledge of the airways as well as the airports in
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the vicinity to ensure that a new procedure will not create a conflict with the previously
existing. Traffic Management requires that ANSP owns some kind of surveillance means
providing position and attitude of the different airspace users in an integrated picture
to take the adequate decision to avoid conflicts.
Self Separation is performed by the airspace users themselves basically by visually
assessing the distance to the rest of airspace users and maintaining this distance be-
tween acceptable limits. The visual assessment could be improved by the use of some
assistance systems as the Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS). Cooperative Col-
lision avoidance includes all the systems between collaborative aircraft as defined by
ICAO. Non cooperative collision avoidance refers to such airspace users not equipped
with ACAS (Automatic Collision Avoidance System) which position and attitude shall
be assessed visually by the pilot.
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Errare humanum est,
sed perseverare diabolicum
Lucio Anneo Seneca (2 BC - 65 )
3
Thesis Objectives
UAS are composed by the air vehicle itself (UAV) and the ground station (GS). This
is a major difference with the conventional airspace users where there is not separation
between control and air vehicle (i.e: the pilot is inside the air vehicle). The operation
of a UAS requires then telecommunication capabilities to maintain control over the
vehicle. This requirement could be derived from the necessity of monitoring the state
of the vehicle, control the attitude of the vehicle, monitoring the flight plan status, etc.
The keystone of this PhD is to look at, beyond the current problem of the UAS
integration, the benefits that such UAS integration could offer to the airspace users,
no matter if manned or unmanned. Such synergies are available in UAS thanks to the
loquacity of the communication in both senses: air vehicle (UAV) to ground station
(GS) or monitoring and GS to UAV or command & control. This loquacity is absent
in conventional aviation where the communication channel (mainly voice radio) is not
used during the majority of the flight with the exception of some intense periods (take
off, landing, transition between airspace sectors...).
This PhD thesis is focused in evaluating the synergies that UAS C&C commu-
nications offers to the situational awareness through the Surveillance and Navigation
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Figure 3.1: Synergy between CNS obtained in the physical layer
functionalities. As these synergies must be available to the rest of airspace users, the
performances in both navigation and surveillance shall be in line with the applicable
standards to guarantee an homogeneous situational awareness among UAS and con-
ventional aircraft.
The aforementioned synergies are to be retrieved from a common physical layer as
seen in figure 3.1 and represent an evolution towards a more integrated interrelation in
which UAS are also part of the infrastructure of the air transport system.
3.1 Communication
UAS has shown to require very loquacious communications (see (111), (112) and (113)).
This intensive use of radiofrequency in UAS is usually perceived as a drawback; the
assignation of a so scarce resource as frequencies is a capital aspect (see (114), (115)).
Nevertheless, is this intensive use of the communications (loquacity) in both sense of
communication (air to ground, ground to air) that allows us its use in positioning, both
in navigation as in surveillance.
The localization, both in navigation and surveillance, is possible thanks to the
retrieved information from the physical layer of the datalink. It is assumed the use of
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a datalink based on TDMA that allows the measurement of the time of flight of the
messages.
This PhD assumes the data throughput described in the literature for Command &
Control purposes as the base to calculate the achievable performance in both navigation
and surveillance. In addition to the messages required by the command & control and
monitoring functions, we propose some specific messages to improve the performance
of the positioning.
3.2 Navigation
Navigation capabilities of UAs are usually not retrieved from legacy NavAids, but from
GNSS.
Figure 3.2 shows how the aircraft could retrieve navigation information that com-
plement the obtained through the GNSS taking advantage of the messages sent by the
rest of users.
Physical media for interconnection
N
Figure 3.2: Navigation through Communication Synergy
Navigation must show compliance with the performance required by ICAO for RNP.
RNP affects several aspects of the flight: the flight crew must have been trained, the
operation must be designed for RNP, the infrastructure shall offer adequate perfor-
mances and the aircraft itself shall be conveniently equipped to perform the designated
duty.
ICAO states several performance requirements in accuracy, integrity, continuity and
availability for RNP. This PhD will focus on the performance obtained in accuracy as
well as integrity.
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An important fact to be considered is the direct access to the physical layer for re-
trieving the navigation data with independence to the semantic content of the messages.
This independence opens the possibility to be employed by third users at the same time
that the information contained in the messages could be encrypted for security reasons.
3.3 Surveillance
Figure 3.3 shows how the messages sent by the aircraft could by used by ANSP to
obtain surveillance data taking advantage of the datalink.
Physical media for interconnection
Figure 3.3: Surveillance through Communication Synergy
As in the case of navigation, the Required Based Surveillance has requirements
affecting several aspects. This PhD will focus on the performance obtained in accuracy
and integrity using as a reference the up to date version of the EUROCONTROL
requirements.
As in the case of navigation, the use of the physical layer for surveillance purposes
opens the possibility to be employed by third users keeping the content of the messages
safe.
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Consequently,
good warriors cause others to come to them
instead of going to the other.
Sun Tzu (544 BC - 496 BC)
4
Proposal design
The communications between GS (Ground Station) and UAV shall be in digital format.
Voice communications are practical for Standard Aviation which relies in the position on
board of a human flight crew that interpret the voice order but increases the complexity
of the on board avionics. The communication GS-UAS shall contain at least a datalink
that allow the exchange of digital information and orders.
OSI structure for digital applications using telecommunication (which is the case
for the UAS control applications) structures each layer using the services provided by
the lower layer (an only the immediate lower layer) and providing services for the upper
layer (and only to the immediate upper layer). This independence between layers allows
improvements in specific layers without affection over the rest of layers but does not
allow to the physical layer that we need to measure the ToF of the messages required
by the positioning algorithm.
For the purpose of this PhD thesis, it is granted a direct access to the physical layer,
where the communication is performed thanks to a generic TDMA over a generic fre-
quency that allow VLOS communication with omnidirectional antennae. The synchro-
nism inherent to TDMA allows the range measurement between emitter and receiver
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by just observing the delay at the reception time.
Once measured the ranges , two different kinds of localization are possible:
• The reception of the same message by different receivers offers the capability to
obtain the position of the emitter if sharing the ranges measured by each receiver
and computing a multilateration surveillance.
• The reception onboard of different messages from different emitters (with known
locations), offers the capability to obtain the position of the receiver giving Nav-
igation information.
Initial implementations of UAS Datalinks uses a dedicated datalink. This imple-
mentation ensures the control of our UAS at the cost of denying the control of more
UAS with the same frequency. The TDMA access allows the sharing of the frequency
enabling advance netcentric capabilities. Some information can be shared among dif-
ferent UAV. E.g: Metar, NOTAM.
A shared channel could present security concerns. Those concerns could be con-
trolled using different techniques (e.g: anti spoofing). Nevertheless this PhD is focused
in the positioning and does not considers the security issues.
4.1 UAS Communications
The telecommunications to be employed by UAS are currently under discussion among
the involved actors in forums as the EUROCAE WG-73 or the RTCA SC-203 where
the contributions to the International Telecommunication Unit (ITU) Conference are
agreed.
This lack of standardization leads to point to point communications between the
ground station and the air vehicle for Line of Sight operations. Figure 4.1 shows a pair
of air vehicles communicating with their respectives ground stations isolately. This
communications setup has the advantage of the inherent flexibility of a self contained
system: flexibility in its design.
Nevertheless, this flexibility is achieved assuming a big cost: the inefficient use of
the radiofrequency spectrum that separated links will impose to guarantee the inde-
pendence of each UAS. For the localization purposes of this PhD presents an additional
drawback: there is only one network participant available; grey aircraft sees its grey
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ground station but does not sees neither the black aircraft nor the black ground sta-
tion. The aircraft could be localized combining distance and angle measurements but
the accuracy of the obtained position will strongly depend on the measurement errors
of only two data.
Figure 4.1: Usual point to point comms in UAS
A way to reduce the effect of the pseudorange errors on the obtained position is to
increment the number of measures. This PhD proposes to assume a radio frequency
network instead of point to point communications. Figure 4.2 shows how the grey
aircraft see its ground station (as in the point to point case presented in fig. 4.1) and
also see both the black aircraft and the black ground station thanks to being sharing
the radio frequency network.
RF Network
Figure 4.2: Proposed net centric comms
A shared network has the additional advantage of being more efficient in the use of
the scarce radiofrequency spectrum compared with the point to point approach. This
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improved efficiency makes the shared network the most plausible option once solved
the standardization matters.
By interposing the RF network between the aircraft and its control station we
increase the available pseudorange measurements which is the main objective, but we
are also increasing the architectural options to deploy the UAS.
In unpopulated areas without available communications means there is not big
difference with the point to point communication, both the air vehicle and the control
station shall have their own communications means. The main difference is that the
radio frequency communication supports the protocols of the RF network allowing more
participants to cooperate.
In zones with dense availability of communications means and presence of UAS
operations, the access to the RF network could be both performed through the control
station own means (as in the case of unpopulated areas) or through the use of a com-
munications provider means. This service provider could allow the remote deployment
of the pilots (even to BLOS locations) thanks to wired networks who reroute the com-
mand&control and the telemetry data from the ground station to the proper antennae
and vice versa .
One main difference between conventional aviation telecommunications and UAS
telecommunications is the latency between messages. In conventional Aviation, the
communications are basically AOC within ATC and airliners. Figure 4.3 shows how
the conventional helicopter on the left performs such communications (blue arrows on
the bottom) at specific moments of its flight (e.g: at the transitions between parking
and taxi, take-off and en route ...) and remaining silent the rest of time.
t t
Figure 4.3: Communication events in conventional aviation vs UAS
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The UAS architecture, with the flight crew displaced to the ground introduces new
communication:
• UAS telemetry,
• UAS command & Control,
• payload monitoring,
• payload control
Payload monitoring and control presents low interest as a Signal of Opportunity as
their presence is not guaranteed during all the phases of the flight.
UAS telemetry and Command & Control presents different advantages. Figure 4.3
shows how these communications (green arrows on the bottom) are required during all
the phases of the flight for ensuring the flight crew situation awareness as well as the
flight crew capacity to take the control of the flight at any moment. The performance
required both for situation awareness and for Control imposes a data update rate that
ensures periodic range measurements.
Being the communications a keystone for the deployment of the UAS, significant
efforts have been directed to the sizing of these communications considering the worst
scenario for safety reasons. Whilst the most remarked aspects is the data through-
put, some indications about the data update rate could be obtained from different
perspectives:
Currently employed communications in generic UAVs are described in (111), ex-
cluding the Payload which shall be considered as specific for each mission. It includes
an estimation of the data throughput required for the command and status messages.
To cope with the difficulty to legally flight a UAS, some research groups employ
conventional aircraft remotely operated with a pilot that could assume the flight control
if necessary. This surrogate aircraft have been employed by the NASA’s Langley re-
search center and the description of the communications employed are shown in (112).
The evaluated communications includes both uplink and downlink for control limited
to aviate purposes, being the navigation a envisaged future upgrade.
From a Air Navigation Service Provider perspective, the interesting point becomes
the Channel Saturation as they have to avoid this possibility. (113) evaluates the
saturation of the UAS Command & Control Channel considering different scenarios.
51
4. PROPOSAL DESIGN
Table 4.1: Communications Latencies
Command& Control Telemetry
Uplink Dowlink
Reference Low High Low High Default Low High
(111) 4Hz 4Hz 1Hz 20Hz
(112) 7Hz 3Hz
(113) 5Hz
Table 4.1 summarizes the data rates proposed in different studies for the UAS
datalink without the video nor the ATC Voice communications.
4.2 Proposed message catalogue
During a UAS mission, several types of communications are involved: air vehicle
Command & Control, air vehicle telemetry, payload control, payload telemetry, ATC,
ACARS, TCAS, SSR modes C and S etc... Some of these communications could even-
tually serve as signal of opportunity to measure pseudoranges and feed the navigation
algorithm, improving the performances obtained using the C&C and telemetry. Nev-
ertheless, this PhD focusses on the achievable performance during the entire flight
(i.e: using UAV C&C and telemetry), discarding those communications which are not
present during the entire flight.
There are initiatives to standardize the command & control communications that
copes with the large variety of UAS and missions to propose a common communication
core. The USA military has largely standardized the command & control between units.
The MIL-STD 6016 (116) has been in use for several years. It defines the messages
employed to transmit orders to military units in the battlefield. It defines the semantic
content of the messages, the way to interpret those messages and the way to code them
taking advantage of the capacities provided by the tactical datalinks as the JTIDS or
the MIDS.
For the purpose of this PhD, only the messages employed in the positioning are
considered assuming for the rest a data throughput and data rates in line as found in
the literature.
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Assuming the capability to measure pseudoranges between several points and a
common point, it could be calculated the position of common point using multilatera-
tion techniques if the position of the rest of point are known. Figure 4.4 illustrates how
the position of the black UAV could be calculated as the intersection of two circles of
radius the measured pseudoranges ρ1 and ρ2 centered on the reported positions of the
grey UAVs ((x1, y1) and (x2, y2)). Then the own position must be reported to enable
its use in their positioning by the rest of users.
ρ 1
ρ 2x1, y1 x2, y2
Figure 4.4: Position report required for multilateration
Figure 4.4 shows an ideal example where the pseudoranges ρi are equal to the
distances d1 between the communicating network users. Nevertheless, the pseudorange
measurement introduces several errors resulting in an intersection similar to the shown
in figure 4.5. As the distance is measured with an unknown error, it shall be interpreted
not as a circle but as an annulus where the probability of found the UAV is higher.
The intersection of two or more annulus no longer provides a single point but an area.
Provided that using multilateration we obtain a surface where the UAV could be found
with a higher probability, it could be interesting to use additional information to reduce
the area provided by the multilateration.
In addition to the multilateration, a better position could be obtained adding a
displacement to the previous position. Figure 4.5 shows how such position could be
calculated using the speed reported by the mobile ~Spi incrementing the last known
position (black UAV) to obtain an approach to the current position (green UAV). Such
speed could contain measurement errors and is not necessarily constant during the
entire period (since the last speed report and the moment where it is being used) but
for short periods provides a good approximation. Then, the propagation of the speed
through the network provides additional information to improve the positioning. The
speed of each aircraft can retrieved from the GPS but also form other sources as the
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inertial systems or a combination of compass and speedometer. We will assume that
speed is given as a 2 dimensions vector (Spxi , Spyi).
S⃗p1
Figure 4.5: Positioning improvement provided by the speed vector
Another mechanism to improve the positioning is improving the pseudorange mea-
surement. Figure 4.6 shows in blue and red how the error in the pseudorange measure-
ment generates a big area. If such pseudorange measurement is improved using clocks
with a more accurate synchronism, the area (green annulus) is reduced. Time deviation
from the common clock could be calculated as an additional parameter of the position-
ing algorithm. We will assume that each aircraft and ground station will calculate and
propagate its own calculated clock bias. This will result in having estimation of the
clock bias of each network user as part of the location algorithm. More detail about
the clock model used is given in section F.
b1
b2
Figure 4.6: Positioning improvement provided by the time bias knowledge
Finally we will assume that all three data (position, speed and clock) are packed in
the same message in the low bandwidth scenario (one message per second) defined in
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table 4.1 instead of increasing the number of messages and eventually the frequency of
communication.
4.3 Physical layer
The time of transmission is structured cyclically over a period. In some data-links
technologies (117), (118), (119), this period is assumed to be the same as the radar in
order to adjust the dissemination of radar tracks to the capacity of tracking. Even if
the mechanical limitations of radars have been solved since long time ago, the cyclical
organization of such datalinks remains in use. This cyclical criteria has been kept in the
simulation both for simplicity as well as for ensuring some commonality with existing
datalink technologies.
Figure 4.10 shows how each node of communication is provided with communica-
tion slots which represents the communication capacity available. Those communica-
tion slots must then correspond with the communication opportunities offered by the
physical layer of the data-link.
Figure 4.7 shows how TDMA allocates the different communication opportunities
distributing it along the time in periods of the same duration (T), using all of them the
same frequency as carrier. Once consumed the entire period T, a new communication
period starts.
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Figure 4.7: Communication Slots organization in TDMA communications
Another significant alternative considered for the access to the physical mean is the
OFDMA. Figure 4.8 shows how OFDMA distributes the communication slots along the
time as well as along the range of frequencies sub-carriers assigned.
In both technologies (TDMA & OFDM) the communication slots are assigned to
a specific time instants in which communication must be performed. Measuring the
difference between the assigned time for transmission and the reception of the message
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Figure 4.8: Communication Slots organization in OFDMA communications
could be calculated the Time of Flight of the message ToF. This ToF allows the distance
measurement between emitter and receiver. Then, for the purposes of this PhD, each
communication slot provides a chance to measure a pseudorange, independently of the
choice between TDMA or OFDMA.
An interesting comparison between TDMA and OFDMA is given in (120). It pro-
poses the future adoption of OFDMA because of its better use of the radiofrequency
spectrum. Nevertheless, it also explains that the already deployed aeronautical com-
munications are based on TDMA.
Then, taking into consideration that:
• ToF measurements could be taken from both TDMA and OFDMA,
• OFDMA is more efficient in the use of radiofrequency spectrum
• OFDMA communications are not yet deployed,
• TDMA communications are already deployed
it has been considered that the access to the physical mean considered in this PhD
thesis has been a TDMA.
The identification of the arriving messages and the network users could be performed
in many ways. The most evident could be by using a signature in the message to be
identified. This technique has the drawback of reducing the available throughput for
the message content. Another alternative could be sharing the overall communication
slot allocation (see (121)). The assignment of the communication slots allows the
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Figure 4.9: Communication Architecture Clock Synchronization
identification of the emitter by the receiver if the allocation takes into account the
maximum distance to be travelled by the message to avoid collisions between messages
(see at section 4.3.2).
Combining this knowledge of the ranges to the different network users with the
knowledge about the positions of these participants could be computed the position of
the aircraft.
In fact the range data acquisition and its further processing constitutes new appli-
cations, depending on where the range data is processed and exploited:
• if the range data is exploited on ground, it constitutes a surveillance application,
• if the range data is exploited on board, the application becomes navigation
• if the range data is both acquired on board and shared could be obtained Sense
& Avoid information
These innovative uses of telecommunications requires a strong synchronization of
the network, but not among the different actors. The relevant for range data acquisition
is the physical layer not the upper layers. The point that needs to be synchronized are
the ground emitter/receiver and the vehicle emitter/receiver which are the end points
of the physical channel.
Figure 4.9 summarizes the needs for clock synchronization on the network. The
ATC, the UAS ground station and the rest of application layer actors does not need
to be strictly synchronized with the network clock, they only need to share data with
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the network. The transmitter /receivers that shares the physical channels requires this
synchronization to measure the time of flight of the messages from which obtain the
range data.
The technology used to achieve the synchronization of the clocks among the network
is not considered part of this PhD thesis.
The discussion about the adequacy of TDMA in front of other transmission patterns
as CDMA or similar are intentionally considered as out of the scope of this PhD thesis,
remaining one interesting field of further developments.
4.3.1 Communication typologies
The integration of the Ground Station into a wider communication infrastructure with
the rest of actors (e.g: other UAS, ATC, meteo...) increases the number of communi-
cations available for measuring pseudoranges. This advantage comes with a drawback,
instead of the simple point to point communications typology required in an isolated
scenario, the RF network must be able to implement different typologies:
• point-to-point. Allowing one participant to emission and other to reception.
• point-multipoint. Allowing one participant to emission and several to reception.
• multipoint-point. Allowing several participants to emission and one to reception.
• multipointmultipoint. (aka party line). Allowing several participants to emission
and reception.
The instantiation of those multiple communication structures are performed thanks
to communication slots assignments that each participants have been assigned by a
Network Manager.
A point to point communication is implemented by assigning permission to write in
a communication slot to a participant and the right to read the same communication
slot to another participant.
Multipoint emissions (present at multipoint-point as well as in multipoint-multipoint)
needs a protocol to avoid emission conflicts. This protocol could be based on aloha or
token ring concepts. Aloha presents the simplicity of its implementation but does not
discard the possibility of conflicts, it only reduces its probability of occurrence. This
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probability of occurrence difficult its use in hard real time environments as the C&C
is. Token ring concept discards the probability of communication conflict introducing
the network administrator that decides at each moment who could write.
Multipoint reception (present at point-multipoint as well as in multipoint-multipoint)
could be implemented by assigning to each receiver the same time slot only with read
access without requiring further protocols. Point-multipoint communication is imple-
mented by assigning the permission to write in a communication slot to a single par-
ticipant and the right to read to several participants. Both kinds of communications
are free of emission conflicts.
c
t
CS
cs
t
cs
c
C
S001
C
S015
C
S300
C
S008
C
S270
cs
GS
cs
atc
C
S001
C
S015
C
S300
C
S008
C
S270
C
S300
W R W
R
R W W
R
W R W
R
R W
Figure 4.10: Communication Slot Assignment
Figure 4.10 shows how the available communication slots are assigned to the dif-
ferent participant. Each of those participants reflects their communication assignment
in their tables of communication slots. In this assignment tables are also reflected the
kind of access the participant is allowed by the Network Manager to manage the differ-
ent kinds of communication required. In the case of fig. 4.10 the conventional aircraft
has a communication slot (CS) to talk. This is reflected in his Communication Slot
allocation table with the write permission (W). The same communication slot appears
in the communication slot allocation table of ATC but their permission is only to read
(R). This point-to-point communication is repeated in the case of the grey UAS (blue
communication slots). The multipoint-multipoint is performed by assigning the same
communication slot (green) with the write and read permission to the three participants
that share the party line.
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4.3.2 Range Constraints
The size of the communication cell is limited by the visibility of the signal and by the
time of flight of the message. The visibility of a signal transmitted between two points
depends on the orography but also on the emission power. Figure 4.11 shows how a
message transmitted with a specific power is received up to a range R0. Using more
power at the emission, the signal could be received farther, up to R+. How much far
depends on the presence of physical obstacles (mountains, Earth curvature) that could
preclude the propagation of the signal in a straight line.
R
0
R
+
Figure 4.11: Signal Visibility
The distance between the communicating points adds a complexity to the time slot
assignment when using TDMA. A message emitted at a time t0 is not received at the
same time by each network user, as the message travels at the speed of the light. This
delay is used to measure the ranges in our proposal and should be considered in order
to avoid simultaneous reception of messages emitted at different times. The allocation
of time slots then takes into account the maximum Time of Flight between two users
to add a period of time between consecutive time slots. Figure 4.12 shows a message
transmitted between two synchronized network users that expends a time of flight D.
D
Figure 4.12: Time of Flight of a Message through the entire cell
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D =
R
c
(4.1)
Equation 4.1 states the delayD to be inserted between time slots as the relation between
the range desired for the cell (R) considered as the longest distance between two points
in the cell and the speed of the light (c).
Equation 4.1 gives the key to design the time slot assignment of a single commu-
nication cell. Adjacent cells must have additional means to avoid messages collisions.
This could be performed by using different frequencies. The pattern of frequency as-
signment must take into account the distance between cells with the same frequency
to avoid interferences. Nevertheless, the cell frequency differentiation applies only for
bidirectional communications that require the fulfilment of the delays calculated with
equation 4.1.
Estudi de viabilitat d'un sistema de monitorització d'helicòpters en vol a l'àrea metropolitana de Barcelona11 
Figure 4.13: Range measurements from outside of the current cell
Figure 4.13 shows how an aircraft placed beyond the radius of a cell could still
employ the transmission of the cell to navigate if knowing the time slot allocation, the
frequency in which the cell operates and it is not beyond the physical limits of the radio
signal propagation. The additional limitation of this use is the difficulty of establishing
dialogues using the frequency of the remote cell as it could generate conflicts.
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4.4 Pseudo Range Measurement
As seen in table 4.1, UAS are quite loquacious systems that requires a constant through-
put to its control. This loquacity allows the measurement of the distance between
emitter and receiver at a frequency of 1Hz or more.
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Figure 4.14: Range measurements
Figure 4.14 summarizes the physics beyond the range measurement: a message
emitted at an instant t0 is received at an instant t0 + D. The delay D corresponds
to the time employed by the electromagnetic signal in travel the distance d existing
between the emission point and the reception point.
d = c×D (4.2)
Equation 4.2 explains how to calculate, in ideal conditions, the distance (d) using
a time measurement (D) which is multiplied by the speed of light (c).
4.4.1 Pseudo Range Measurement errors
The measured ranges are not exact measures of the distance between emitter and
receiver (di) as they include some uncertainties derived from the implementation lim-
itations of the equipment. Eq.4.3 reflects some of the errors observed in the distance
measurement:
ρi = di + esynch + eT i + eM i + eproj + edmt (4.3)
where:
• ρi, Pseudorange measurement between target and user i
• di, Actual distance between target and user i
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• esynch, Range measurement error caused by the synchronism of emitter and re-
ceivers clocks
• eT i , Range measurement error caused by the Troposphere between target an user
i
• eM i , Multipath component; Range measurement error caused by the different
trajectories that the signal could take between target an user i
• eproj , error of projection; error in the distance measurement due to the use of 3D
measures in a 2D model
• edmt, different measurement time error; error in the distance measurement due
to the use of measures taken at different instants of time between network users
which have relative positions evolving in the time.
4.4.1.1 Synchronism error (esynch)
The clocks of each Network User are synchronized to the same time reference but
with a certain level of precision that affects the accuracy in the range measurement.
c(dt0− dti) Fig. 4.15 tries to summarize how an error in the synchronism affects at the
Figure 4.15: Range Measurement Error generated by synchronism
measurement of the distance and generates an error in the measurement. The black
aircraft and the black antennae represents two network users perfectly synchronized.
The time of emission at which the message is sent by the aircraft is known by both users
and then the difference between the time of emission and the measurement of the time
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of arrival of the message multiplied by c should give the distance between both users.
This is true for the black aircraft which is perfectly synchronized with the receiver.
If the clock of the aircraft is advanced, the message will be sent in advance and
consequently the difference between the theoretical time of emission and the time of
reception will represent a smaller magnitude than if the clocks where perfectly synchro-
nized. This results in considering the aircraft nearer than it really is (grey aircraft at
the right of the true position of the aircraft, represented in black).
If the clock of the aircraft is delayed, the message will be sent later on and conse-
quently, the difference between the theoretical time of emission and the time of reception
will represent a bigger magnitude than if the clocks where perfectly synchronized. This
results in considering the aircraft farer than it really is (grey aircraft at the left of the
true position of the aircraft, represented in black).
4.4.1.2 Troposphere error (eT i)
Figure 4.16 shows how the content of water in the atmosphere could affect the trans-
mission of the signal modifying the speed at which the message travels. The black line
represents the straight line travel of a signal through an atmosphere with a low content
of water vapour. The gray line represents the same travel in straight line but this time
through an atmosphere with a high content of water vapour. The higher content of
water vapour, the lower speed of transmission for radio-frequency signals. This lower
speed produces a delay in the arrival of the signal which is transferred to the range
estimation as a bigger range than the real.
Figure 4.16: Range Measurement Error generated by troposphere content of H2O vapour
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The value of the water vapour content in the atmosphere varies slowly with a time
scale of hours producing biases in the range measurement that could not be filtered and
requiring its estimation. It could be estimated thanks to the meteorological information
available at the region if distributed through the network. It could also be estimated as
an additional variable of the equations, requiring in this case more range measurements.
Being its effect considerably big for the scale of the problem, and considering that
could be estimated with already existing means, it has been omitted from this thesis.
4.4.1.3 Multipath error (eM i)
Figure 4.17 shows how the signal travels in a straight line (black line) from the emitter
to the receiver. As the signal is emitted in all directions, it could also arrive to the
receiver after rebounding in some surfaces (gray dotted line). These rebounded signals
travels a bigger distance than the one that has travelled in straight line generating an
error in the range measurement as the receiver could have difficulties to identify when
is arrived the correct signal.
Figure 4.17: Range Measurement Error generated by multipath
This multipath error presents big inconveniences for its use in navigation. It intro-
duces biases that endure over time, preventing its filtering. This is a common problem
for localization based on radiofrequency.
This multipath error presents a behaviour attached closely to the characteristics
of the location. Different materials (e.g: lakes vs forests) have different reflections
as well as different terrain shapes (e.g: urban canyons vs extensive agriculture ). .
The behaviour of the multipath effect also depends on the frequency employed for the
transmission which, for the case of the UAS, are still under discussion.
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Being the multipath effect a very complex item which depends of aspects still to
be defined (e.g: the frequency employed), its characterization has been deliberately
omitted in this Phd thesis.
4.4.1.4 Error of projection (eproj)
Fig. 4.18 tries to summarize how the measures obtained in the 3 dimensional space
introduce an error when translating to 2D. The position to be considered when using
2 dimension representation of the space is the projection of the aircraft position (black
aircraft) over the plane containing the receiver (intersection of the segmented black line
and the horizontal dotted line), whilst if using the distance d as the distance between
receiver and projected position what we are considering is a different projection at a
longer distance (gray aircraft) with an error of projection eproj indicated as a red dotted
line.
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Figure 4.18: Range Measurement Error generated by 2 dimensional problem statement
The distance between receiver and the projected position could be calculated as in
eq. 4.4.
dproj = d cosα (4.4)
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Then, eq. 4.5 states the error introduced in the distance measure by the fact of
assuming that a measure taken in a 3 D space could be employed in a 2 D model.
eproj = d− dproj = d− d cosα = d(1− cosα) (4.5)
Applying the definition of arcsin to the figure 4.18 results in Eq. 4.6.
α = arcsin
(
h
d
)
(4.6)
Applying eq.4.6 to eq.4.5 results in eq.4.7.
eproj = d
(
1− cos arcsin
(
h
d
))
(4.7)
where could be observed that increments in the distance between users decrement the
eproj whilst increments in the difference between altitudes increment eproj .
4.4.1.5 Different measurement times (edmt)
The use of messages sent at different times for retrieving navigation data introduces an
error in the calculated position. Figure 4.19 shows how a message sent by the helicopter
at a time t0 to the UAV provides the opportunity to measure a pseudorange ρ1. Using
this pseudorange and the communicated position of the helicopter could be created a
linearized equation as shown in par. A
T
0
ρ 1
Figure 4.19: Range Measurement at t0
Figure 4.20 shows how another message coming from a communication tower is em-
ployed later on by the UAS to measure a new pseudorange (ρ2) and to create another
equation describing UAV’s position. At this instant UAV could describe its position
with two equations related to two pseudorange measurements: The equation describ-
ing the position of UAS at t0 (helicopter, arrow and UAV in grey) and the equation
describing the position at t1 (helicopter, arrow and UAV in black).
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Equations retrieved at t0 and t1 describe different positions of the UAV. Describing
the UAV position with these two equations and find an approximation, we are assuming
that the UAV is somewhere in between the UAV position at t0 and the UAV position
at t1. The difference between the position calculated and the current due to the use of
equations constructed at different times is represented in this PhD as edmt
T
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Figure 4.20: Range Measurement at t1
It should be taken into account that edmt is present only if pseudorange measure-
ments of different times are used as belonging to the same instant. In the case of a
surveillance implementation, a unique message could be received at different places. In
this case, all the equations retrieved from the reception of the message describe the
position of the UAV at the instant of emission and consequently its edmt = 0.
The simplicity of using measures retrieved at the same intant of time as shown by the
surveillance approach is not always applicable to the navigation due to the difficulty of
receiving different messages at the same time. Nevertheless, a complementary strategy
to minimize this effect could be employed if additional information is shared through
the network. Figure 4.21 shows the speed vectors of each user (Sp1 for the aircraft and
Sp0 for the own UAV speed) are shared through the network.
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Figure 4.21: Pseudorange improved estimation at t1
Figure 4.22 shows how the knowledge of both ~Sp0 and ~Sp1 does not provides a new
measure of the pseudorange ρ1 but gives the opportunity of estimating more accurately
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different informations as: current positions of both the helicopter and the UAV, the
pseudorange ρ10 from the estimated positions as well of having a better idea of the
direction at which the UAV is located.
T
1
ρ 1
ρ 2
S⃗p1
S⃗p0
ρ 10
Figure 4.22: Range Measurement at t0
4.5 PoCoLoCo Methodology
The transmission of messages through the TDMA network provides the opportunity to
measure the range between emitter and receiver. The loquacity of the communications
is given in both directions, from aircraft to the ground station (telemetry) and from
ground station to the aircraft (command & control).
Figure 4.23: PoCoLoCo capabilities
Figure 4.23 shows the two different alternatives to measure the ranges:
• The grey UAS in the left sent a message that is received by several Network
Users on ground. In this case the positioning could be performed sharing the
range measurements in the ground, providing surveillance information.
• The black UAS in the right of the figure receives different messages from different
network users. In this case, the range measurement is performed on board and
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the positioning obtained thanks to these range measurements provides navigation
information to the UAS.
In both cases (Surveillance and Navigation) what we obtain is a set of range mea-
surements from a point to several other points which position is known that could be
exploited using the same technique.
Each distance from a known position could be expressed as in equation 4.8, which
describes the distance between two point in a plane.
di =
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 (4.8)
Nevertheless, what we can measure is not the exact distance, but a pseudorange,
as expressed in equation 4.3 that contains different error generated by different sources
as explained in section 4.4.1. Assuming that we can not get the real distance di and in
fact we use the pseudorange ρi, we combine equation 4.8 with the formulation of the
pseudorange expressed in equation 4.3 and we obtain equation 4.9.
ρi =
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + esynch + eT i + eM i + eproj + edmt (4.9)
Some of the errors stated in equation 4.9 can be estimated. Using these error
estimations results in a more accurate ρi. This approach is as good as the models
employed for estimating the errors could be.
In the case of eT i the content of water vapour in the troposphere could be retrieved
from the meteorological reports and be employed to fix the error generated. This error
is not modelled (nm).
eM i becomes more conflictive as it depends notably on several aspects as the orog-
raphy, the carrier employed as well as the method employed to detect the arrival of a
message. Being the carriers to be assigned for UAS communications still under discus-
sion, this effect has not further be modelled in the simulations.
For the eproj , the barometric altitude of the flight could be employed as a model
of altitude reducing the error introduced. Being an easy to fix error that increases the
complexity of the simulation, it has been obviated (nm) by placing the network users
in very near altitudes.
The edmt is modelled in different ways depending on the knowledge about the tra-
jectory of the emitter as explained later on section 4.5.3.
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ρi =
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + esynch +*nmeT i +*
nm
eM i +:
nmeproj + edmt (4.10)
Then, applying the estimation of the error we can formalize each range measurement
as:
ρi =
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + esynch + i (4.11)
i accounts for all non modelled propagation factors, such as multipath.
Given an architecture with n point of known position and the range measurement
between those points and the UAS, a set of equations describing each of the individual
range measurements can be written. Geometrically speaking, each of these measure-
ments locates the UAS into an annulus defined by a radius equal to the measured range
and width depending on the accuracy of the measures. The intersection of more than
2 annulus provide an area where the UAS (x, y) is located. Nevertheless the obtained
equations are not linear and consequently, the complexity of solving the system difficult
its use.
To simplify the resolution, equation (4.11) is linearised using Taylor theorem (more
details in A) around an approximate position (x0, y0):
ρi ' ρi0 +
x− xi
ρi0
dx+
y − yi
ρi0
dy + dt (4.12)
where ρi0 is the estimated range for station i: ρi0 =
√
(x0 − xi)2 + (y0 − yi)2; and
deviations from this approximated position are given by dx = x− x0, and dy = y− y0.
Writing the previous equation for all the n receiver measurements in matrix form
leads to:
 ρ1 − ρ10...
ρn − ρn0
 '

x0−x1
ρ10
y0−y1
ρ10
1
...
...
x0−xn
ρn0
y0−yn
ρn0
1
 ·
 dxdy
cdt
 (4.13)
where the difference between the measured pseudorange (ρi) and the estimated
pseudorange (ρi0) is related to the corrections (dx, dy, cdt) to be applied through a
geometry matrix.
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4.5.1 GNSS analogy
Equation 4.13 could be represented more compactly as:
Y ' H ·X (4.14)
where adopting GNSS positioning nomenclature, Y is the observables vector, X the
unknowns (or state) vector and H the geometry matrix.
In GNSS positioning a single receiver is measuring ranges sent by several emitters
(satellites). The emitter clock biases are estimated (with information contained in the
GNSS navigation message) while the receiver clock bias is the fourth unknown to be
computed along with the receiver position (x, y, z).
Different methods are proposed in the GNSS literature (122) for solving linear
equation such as equation (4.13) or (4.14) which are written each time a measurement
is performed. The different kinds of information available could lead to the election of
a simple method as least squares (if there is only information about the pseudoranges)
or a more sophisticate as extended kalman filter that allows the use of complementary
information for refining the positioning information.
A parallelism could be observed between GNSS and PoCoLoCo by substituting the
satellites of GNSS by network users in PoCoLoCo; in both cases there is a common
point and a set of pseudoranges measurements between the common point and other
points which position is known. This analogy is valid both if the aircraft receives the
messages (navigation), as well as if the aircraft sends messages which are received at a
set of network users (surveillance). This parallelism has its limits in the location of all
the actors in a relative narrow interval of altitudes (few kilometres) by comparing with
the positioning of the GNSS satellites in their orbital planes at heights of thousands of
kilometres.
Taking advantage of the GNSS knowledge about positioning present at the litera-
ture, PoCoLoCo is proposed offering positioning in 2 dimensions (x, y) and time (t). We
assume the clocks of the emitters and the receivers are synchronized with an accuracy
in line with clocks available commercially and it is calculated the difference between
the aircraft clock and the common clock. The position of the PoCoLoCo network users
is shared through the network when available and, depending on the availability of
attitude and speed information, estimated between two positions reports.
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4.5.2 EKF Basic Setup
The Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) computes the state (X) using the measures (Y )
combined with a measurement model (PY ) and a geometry matrix (H) (that shall be
calculated at each iteration) to correct the prevision performed using the process noise
(Q) and the transition matrix (A). See Annex B for more in depth explanation. Next,
the setup of matrices X, Y , PY , H, A and Q is presented:
• The state (X) is defined as the corrections to the estimated position in 2 D and
the time:
X =
 dxdy
cdt
 (4.15)
• The measures (Y ) are defined as the difference between the estimated and the
measured ranges:
Y =
 ρ1 − ρ10...
ρn − ρn0
 (4.16)
• The measurement model (PY ) shall bound the total error of each measure. For
this purpose we employ the UERE concept (User Equivalent Range Error), widely
known in GNSS; assuming that the different sources of error are independent,
their σ could be root-sum-squared to obtain an overall value for σi.
σ2i = σ
2
synchi
+ σ2T i + σ
2
M i + σ
2
proji + σdmti (4.17)
The sources of error have been previously explained at section 4.4.1. The availability
of reliable models for some errors as eT i , eM i and eproji has been taking into consid-
eration for discarding both simulation and modelling of these errors to concentrate in
the core aspects of PoCoLoCo methodology.
σ2i = σ
2
synchi
+ 
 
0
σ2T i +
>
0
σ2M i +
*0
σ2proji + σdmti (4.18)
The case of edmti requires a more detailed explanation as it is generated by a
model of the environment that does not match with the reality. The achievement
of a more accurate model depends deeply on the amount of available information in
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its situational awareness, information which should be shared in a cooperative way
through the messages exchanged through the network.
PY =
 σ
2
1
. . .
σ2n
 (4.19)
• The geometry matrix (H) is generated using the unitary vectors defining the
direction from each network user to the estimated position of the aircraft:
H =

x0−x1
ρ10
y0−y1
ρ10
1
...
...
x0−xn
ρn0
y0−yn
ρn0
1
 (4.20)
• For the transition matrix (A), we consider the implementation of the navigation
algorithm as a random kinematic process(122) results in eq.4.21 .
A =
 0 0
0
 ; (4.21)
• For the process noise matrix (Q) we consider the dynamics of the system in which
the clock offset at each sampling is modelled as a white noise random variable,
with a mean of zero and a variance of σ2dt.
Q =
 q˙x∆t q˙y∆t
q˙t∆t
 (4.22)
where ∆t is the time between two consecutive samples and q˙j =
dσ2j
dt is the spectral
density of coordinate j random process (j = {x, y, t}). q˙j = dσ
2
j
dt could be bounded
depending on the available information to obtain more accurate results.
4.5.3 Options of the EKF kinematic model
For the UAS of the simulated Scenario, the White Noise of the kinematic model could
be bounded with the knowledge of the own aircraft trajectory and performance as
well as the information available about the kind of UAS performing the flights, its
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performance and their flight intentions. Different levels of awareness has been selected
to simulate its impact on the navigation:
• Basic Scenario,
• Own trajectory,
• Overall Flight Intention,
• Time Bias.
The ”Basic Scenario” assumes the maximum speeds of the network users as a common
bound for x and y.
The ”Own trajectory” assumes that an inertial system is on board and provides
an approximation to the aircraft speed which is employed as bound for the kinematic
model.
The ”Overall Flight Intention” assumes that an inertial system is on board of each
network user and the information about speed is propagated through the network.
Finally, the ”Time Bias” assumes the existence of an inertial onboard and the
propagation of the speed information through the network as well as the propagation
of the calculated time bias between own clock and the common clock.
4.5.3.1 Basic Scenario
The strongest assumption for the navigation based on the range measurements is that
there is not additional navigation knowledge about own aircraft trajectory neither in-
formation about the participants flight intentions. Range measurements are employed
as measured without any correction in both Y and H.
In this method, the range measurements are obtained at an instant but could be
employed employed for navigation purposes with a delay of ∆tmeas. The time elapsed
since the last position estimation is noted as ∆test.
The maximum speed achievable by the aircraft SpdMax is used to bound Q. Tak-
ing a conservative approach motivated by the absence of specific knowledge about the
trajectory, the next position could be in any direction at the Spd0Max: q˙x = q˙y =
Spd0Max m
2/s. Moreover, ∆test depends on the elapsed time since the last position cal-
culation. The declared accuracy of the clock clkacc is used to bound the time component
of Q. Wrapping up, Q is set up as:
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Figure 4.24: Only Navigation Mean
Q =
 Spd0Max
2
∆test
Spd0Max
2
∆test
(c · clkacc)2
 (4.23)
The representation of the range measurement uncertainty in the Kalman Filter
employed for navigate is done in PY , where we must consider two different sources of
error:
• the synchronism error (σsynchi),
• the measurement delay (σdmti).
Therefore, the PY is set up as:
PY =

σ2
synch10
+ σ2
dmt10
. . .
σ2synchn0
+ σ2dmtn0
 (4.24)
where the synchronism of the common network user (σ2synch0) and the remote user
(σ2synchi) are considered:
σ2synchi0
= σ2synch0 + σ
2
synchi
(4.25)
σsynchi is selected taking into account the synchronism accuracy that COTS technolo-
gies can provide nowadays. Among the different technological solutions we have con-
sidered the worst case in accuracy: embedded technologies which, in turn, provides the
system with more flexibility. Typical synchronism values for these systems are around
100 ns (42), which are translated to range measurement accuracies of c · 100 ns = 30 m.
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σdmti0
is bounded only by the displacement at maximum speeds of the common
point since the last position estimation (SpdMax0∆test) and the displacement of the
rest of users since their last measurement (SpdMaxi∆tmeas):
σ2dmti0
= SpdMax20∆test + SpdMax
2
i∆tmeas (4.26)
4.5.3.2 Own trajectory
Figure 4.25: Own Flight Intention Knowledge
The generically bounded kinematic model represented in eq.(4.23) could be im-
proved by the use of the own trajectory information, which should be available onboard.
The trajectory knowledge could be retrieved from different systems or combination of
systems(e.g: Compass + inertial) or derived from previous position calculations and is
represented as a unitary vector ~r.
~r =
(
rx
ry
)
(4.27)
Using the unitary vector of eq.(4.27) to better adapt the process noise to each
component, Q is set up as:
Q =
 (SpdMaxrx)2∆test (SpdMaxry)2∆test
(c · clkacc)2
 (4.28)
If the knowledge of our situational awareness is not limited to ~r and we have access
to the speed vector ~Sp,
~Sp0 =
(
Spx0
Spy0
)
(4.29)
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we can improve the estimation of the own position (x+0 , y
+
0 ) by just adding to the
position calculated in the previous iteration (x−0 , y
−
0 ) the displacement generated by
the speed (Spx, Spy) during the time elapsed since the last measurement (∆tmeas).(
x+0
y+0
)
=
(
x−0
y−0
)
+
(
Spx0
Spy0
)
∆tmeas (4.30)
Using own position (x+0 , y
+
0 ) as calculated in equation 4.30 could be obtained a
better estimation of the pseudorange (ρ+i0)
ρ+i0 =
√
(x+0 − xi)2 + (y+0 − yi)2 (4.31)
and consequently a better value of the measurements vector (Y +) which is in fact
the difference between the estimated range (ρi0 or ρ
+
i0
) and the measured range (ρi).
Y + =
 ρ1 − ρ
+
10
...
ρn − ρ+n0
 (4.32)
Once the optimization of pseudorange (ρ+i0) is performed and with the optimized
own position (x+0 , y
+
0 ) as calculated in equation 4.30 an optimized geometry matrix
(H+) is generated
H+ =

x+0 −x1
ρ+10
y+0 −y1
ρ+10
1
...
...
x+0 −xn
ρ+n0
y+0 −yn
ρ+n0
1
 (4.33)
PY could also be improved thanks to the knowledge of the speed of the rest of
network users:
PY =
 σ
2
synch + σdmt1
. . .
σ2synch + σdmt1
 (4.34)
where σ2synch remains unchanged as we have not additional information about the
synchronism of the clocks. σ2
dmti0
is changed to reflect the better knowledge of the
estimation of the pseudoranges. The difference between the pseudoranges calculated
with the formerly estimated position (ρi0) and adding the estimated displacement to
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the position (ρ+i0) is used as a component of σ
2
dmti0
. As the relative direction of both
network users are not known, it is used the estimated displacement of the aircraft
since the last position calculation (Sp0∆test) to bound as well the σ
2
dmti0
. Finally, the
maximum speed of the other network user is also use as bound.
σ2dmti0
= (ρi0 − ρ+i0)2 + Sp0∆test + SpdMaxi∆tmeas (4.35)
where Spi represent the modulus of the speed vector ~Spi:
Spi =
√
Sp2xi + Sp
2
yi (4.36)
4.5.3.3 Overall Flight Intention
Figure 4.26: Overall Flight Intention Knowledge
The range measurements are obtained through a data link that could also provide
the speed vector of each participant ( ~Spi). Alternatively, in an environment where the
speed of the participants are not shared through the data link, those speed vectors
could be derived from log containing the latest positions.
~Spi =
(
Spxi
Spyi
)
(4.37)
we can improve the estimation of the positions of the rest of participants by just
adding to the position reported in the last message (x−i , y
−
i ) the displacement generated
by the speed (Spx, Spy) during the time elapsed since the last report (∆trepi).(
x∗i
y∗i
)
=
(
x−i
y−i
)
+
(
Spxi
Spyi
)
∆trepi (4.38)
Using both the optimized positions (x+i , y
+
i ) from eq. 4.30 and (x
∗
i , y
∗
i ) from eq.
4.38 could be obtained a better estimation of the pseudorange (ρ∗i0)
ρ∗i0 =
√
(x+0 − x∗i )2 + (y+0 − y∗i )2 (4.39)
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and consequently a better value of the measurements vector (Y ∗) than using ρ+i0)
and the measured range (ρi).
Y ∗ =
 ρ1 − ρ
∗
10
...
ρn − ρ∗n0
 (4.40)
Once the optimization of pseudorange (ρ∗i0) is performed and with the optimized
own position (x+0 , y
+
0 ) as calculated in equation 4.30 as well as the optimized positions
of the rest of users (x∗i , y
∗
i ) an optimized geometry matrix (H
∗) is generated
H∗ =

x+0 −x∗1
ρ∗10
y+0 −y∗1
ρ∗10
1
...
...
x+0 −x∗n
ρ∗n0
y+0 −y∗n
ρ∗n0
1
 (4.41)
The other participants trajectories information and the own trajectory knowledge
could be employed to bound the Measurement Covariance Matrix PY .
PY =

σ2
synch10
+ σ2
dmt10
. . .
σ2synchn0
+ σ2dmtn0
 (4.42)
where σ2synch remains unchanged as we have not additional information about the
synchronism of the clocks and σ2
dmti0
is changed to reflect the better knowledge of the
estimation of the pseudoranges. The difference between the pseudoranges calculated
with the formerly estimated position (ρi0) and adding the estimated displacement of
both network user to their respective positions (ρ∗i0) is used to bound σ
2
dmti0
. It is used
the estimated displacement of the aircraft since the last position calculation (Sp0∆test)
and the estimated displacement of the other network user (Spi∆tmeas) since the last
measurement (tmeas) to bound as well the σ
2
dmti0
.
σ2dmti0
= (ρi0 − ρ∗i0)2 + Sp0∆test + Spi∆tmeas (4.43)
4.5.3.4 Time Bias
Time Bias merits an special consideration. The physics of the clocks employed in
communications (see section F) produces a bias that is not filtered by the Kalman
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filter. This leads to the estimation of the own clock error to reduce the effect of the
esynch over the navigation solution.
If the time bias is shared with the rest of users it could be employed to improve the
pseudoranges sustracting the bias of each user.
ρ◦i = ρ− c · dti (4.44)
leading to a more accurate measurements:
Y ◦ =
 ρ
◦
1 − ρ10
...
ρ◦n − ρn0
 (4.45)
A better knowledge of the clock bias motivates also a better bounding of the PY as
we count on better measurements.
PY =

σ2
synch10
+ σ2
dmt10
. . .
σ2synchn0
+ σ2dmtn0
 (4.46)
This time σ2
dmti0
is bounded depending on the situational awareness as described in
previous sections. For the component introduced by the synchronism error (σ2
synchi0
),
the contribution of the common point must be calculated as before, but the component
of the rest of users could be reduced to the Allan deviation (σAi) of each clock as the
bias is shared:
σ2synchi0
= σ2synch0 + σ
2
Ai (4.47)
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We dare not to do many things because they are hard,
but they are hard because we dare not.
Lucio Anneo Seneca (2 BC - 65 )
5
Simulation setup
A simulation scenario has been designed to test the Surveillance and Navigation capa-
bilities offered by the communications. In this scenario, all the UAS share the TDMA
network. Each UAS is composed by an unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and its ground
station (GS). Three different UAS are simulated simultaneously:
• Metropolitan area traffic monitoring
• Coastal Lifeguard.
• Vineyard Aerial Works.
The simulation envisaged to validate the concept requires to take into account the
number of messages interchanged over the TDMA network, the position reported by
each actor, the messages received and the clock accuracies of both the emitter and the
receivers.
The algorithm 1 shows how the time slots assignment is employed to structure
the simulation. It could be seen how the actors (both UAV and GS) measure the
pseudorange when receives a message. Using the position reported in the ”Position
Report” messages, the position of the actors could be calculated with the methodology
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explained in paragraph 4.5. The algorithm 1 simulates the continuous operation of the
UAS for a period of 24 hours.
Algorithm 1 Positioning Simulation Algorithm
for all TimeSlots do
for all Actors receiving the message do
measure distance from Emitter to Receivers in LoS
if Message is Position Report then
Store Reported Position
end if
Estimate distance from estimated own position to reported positions
Calculate Distance Difference
Compute Q
Compute PY
Feed the Kalman Filter
Kalman Filter Predict
Kalman Filter Correct
end for
end for
The positioning capacity of the proposed algorithm is verified using a simulated
set of measurements obtained from the different trajectories as shown in Fig. 5.1. To
obtain each range measurement the simulation follows the next steps:
• The intended position for the current time slot of the Emitter is computed.
• The intended Emitter position is modified to reflect the uncertainties of the real
world,
• The intended position for the current time slot of the Receiver is computed.
• The intended Receiver position is modified to reflect the uncertainties of the real
world,
• These simulated positions are used to compute the Actual Range,
• The Actual Range is modified by adding a noise Ns (see fig. 5.1) to simulate
realistic Measures.
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Ne
Simulated 
Measure
Real World
Emitter
Flight
Intent
Emitter
Sim. Trajectory
Actual
Range
Real WorldReceiver
Flight 
Intent ReceiverSim. Trajectory
NRx
Figure 5.1: Measurements Simulation
.
The Simulated Measure are used as input into the navigation algorithm and the
position results are compared with the actual position. The accuracy is test against
the required values in two dimensions (see Annex F): along the track eat and cross track
ect. The accuracy obtained is plotted in absolute values and in frequency of occurrence.
The accuracy statistics are confronted with the required values for the 95%.
Using the covariances of the Kalman filter, an upper bound for the error is calculated
as explained in annex D that serves to guarantee that the error obtained is below the
required value on the 1− 10−7 of the times. This value is plotted confronted with the
actual error showing: the compliance with the integrity alarm values, the integrity of
these alarms and how the estimation of the upper bound fits with the actual error.
5.1 Noise of the measures
As explained in 4.4.1, measurements of pseudoranges contain errors (summarized in
eq. 4.3) that should be also simulated to obtain realistic results. Before applying the
tracking algorithm, the actual ranges are modified with a noise Ni to simulate realistic
conditions:
Ni = Nsynchi +
*0NTi +
*0NMi +
:0Nproji +Ndmti (5.1)
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As explained before, eTi , eMi and eproji are not being simulated in this PhD, then
their contributions (NTi , NMi and Nproji)to Ni are 0.
Eq.(5.2) shows how Nsynchi comprises the error introduced by the emitter (Ne) and
the receiver (NRx).
Nsynchi = Ne +NRx (5.2)
Ne = c ∗ dt (5.3)
NRx = c ∗ dti (5.4)
Eq.(5.3) shows how Ne is composed by the error between emitter and the reference
time. dt is simulated as a normally distributed pseudo-aleatory with null mean and
a standard deviation of 100 ns, accuracy affordable for existing technology (see (42))
being reasonable accuracies up to 20 nanoseconds if shifting from the embedded devices
to a rack device. Considering c, Ne has maximum values of 30 m for each Rx.
Eq.(5.4) shows how NRx is composed by the error between Rx and the reference
time. dti is simulated as a normally distributed pseudoaleatory with null mean and
a standard deviation of 100 ns, accuracy affordable for existing technology (see (42)).
Considering c, NRx has maximum values of 30 m for each Rx.
edmti is not simulated by adding a noise Ndmti but by just generating different
measures at different times, depending on the time slot allocation of each network
participant. In this way, the current measure has an edmti = 0, error that is increases
as it becomes older because the network users had moved since the measurement time.
5.2 Simulated Flights
A set of three UAS flights has been simulated with trajectories coherent with operations
already in use in a metropolitan area:
• Traffic monitoring fig.5.2a,
• Lifeguard supervision of the coastline fig.5.2b,
• Vineyard monitoring fig.5.2c.
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A trajectory similar to the some of the main motorways surrounding Barcelona has
been simulated in fig 5.2a). The entire flight has been simulated at a constant speed of
40 msec . In addition to the simulated trajectory, the Barcelona area has more motorways
whose monitoring could raise a richer scenario than our proposal.
A lifeguard flight has been simulated in fig 5.2b). The entire flight has been simu-
lated at a constant speed of 20 msec . The monitoring of the beach areas of the metropoli-
tan area of Barcelona (and the rest of Catalonia) could require several UAS, resulting
in a scenario richer than our proposal.
A small vineyard monitoring flight has been simulated in fig 5.2c). The entire flight
has been simulated at a constant speed of 10 msec . There is a lot of wine producers in
the area of Barcelona that could require this kind of flights. As in the aforementioned
cases, considering more that more than one UAS is monitoring vineyards will result in
a richer scenario than our proposal for this simulation.
(a) Traffic Monitoring Trajec-
tory UAVt
(b) Lifeguard Trajectory
UAVl
(c) Vineyard Trajectory UAVv
Figure 5.2: Accuracies of Rx distributions
Once the current position of the intended flight trajectory is computed, it is modified
to simulate the inaccuracies that real world conditions could impose. At each sample,
all coordinates are modified with a zero mean normally distributed noise with σ = 10m
for the x and y and σ = 2m for the z. Those deviations are introduced with the purpose
of stressing the tracking algorithm.
Fig. 5.3 shows the simulated flight paths, without the effect of the aforementioned
deviations, over the map. The position of the ground stations are indicated by a triangle
of the same color as the UAV trajectory.
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Figure 5.3: Flight test and Receiver Stations Rx simulated
5.2.1 Visibility
The amount of measures available for each UAS will depend on the amount of messages
produced (which is explained in table 5.4) and on the portion of messages received
that could in turn depend on different variables as the distance between actors or the
orography.
Table 5.1: Reduced Visibility
Emitter
Listener UAVt GSt UAVl GSl UAVv GSv
UAVt
√ √ √ √
UAVl
√ √ √ √
UAVv
√ √ √
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Table 5.1 summarizes the selected static model of visibility between air vehicle and
GS. Subindexes t, l and v stands respectively for traffic, lifeguard and vineyard. Each
air vehicle could see the other air vehicle and its own GS as a minimum. Additionally
UAVl could see GSt and UAVt could see the GSl.
The visibility model summarized in table 5.1 does not take advantage of all the
available transmission to measure distances, discarding good measurements from static
positions. In the case of UAVt and UAVl the discarded measures correspond to only
one GS GSv.
In the case of UAVv the measures from two different GS GSt and GSl are discarded,
keeping two mobile references UAVt and UAVl and as the only static reference its own
GSv.
A slightly improved visibility model is also simulated to assess the effect of adding
measures to the equation system. The listener has the capability to receive the messages
sent by any of the other users (see table 5.2). The number of measures passes for UAVt
and UAVl from 4 to 5 and in the case of UAVv passes from 3 measures to 5.
Table 5.2: Improved Visibility
Emitter
Listener UAVt GSt UAVl GSl UAVv GSv
UAVt
√ √ √ √ √
UAVl
√ √ √ √ √
UAVv
√ √ √ √ √
The visibility for surveillance purposes has been selected considering that GS com-
municate among them and UAV do not contribute to the surveillance tasks. Each GS
(GSt,GSl and GSv) has the capability to receive the messages sent by any of the air
vehicles(UAVt, UAVl and UAVv) (see table 5.3). The number of measures for each
UAV remains at 3 (one measure from each GS).
5.3 time slots
Whilst table 4.1 summarizes some typical values of update rates for both the uplink and
the downlink, a more conservative update rates of 1Hz for both Uplink and Downlink
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Table 5.3: Visibility for Surveillance
Emitter
Listener UAVt GSt UAVl GSl UAVv GSv
GSt
√ √ √
GSl
√ √ √
GSv
√ √ √
has been selected to evaluate the accuracy performance in poor conditions. The adop-
tion of 1Hz as transmission rate for the uplink messages, instead of the under demand
proposed in different studies, has been selected considering the necessity of detecting
the lost of the datalink by the UAS.
Table 5.4: Basic Time Slot Assignment
Frame
Second 0 Second 1 Second 13
Emitter .15 .25 .35 .5 .75 .85
UAVv • • •
GSv • • •
UAVl • • •
GSl • • •
UAVt • • •
GSt • • •
Table 5.4 shows a basic distribution of the Time Slots assigned to each actor in
the network where each actor transmits only one message per second. In column
Second 0 is shown how UAVv transmits its downlink message in second 0 and 150
milliseconds, whilst its ground station GSv transmits in second 0 and 250 milliseconds;
UAVl second 0 and 350 milliseconds, GSl second 0 and 500 milliseconds; UAVt second
0 and 750 milliseconds, GSt second 0 and 850 milliseconds. For second 1 to 13, the
time distribution is repeated. The (•) indicates that the transmitted message contains
the position.
Table 5.5 shows a Time Slot assignment similar to the reflected in 5.4 but increasing
the position reports of the air vehicles (UAVv, UAVl and UAVt) to two times per second.
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Table 5.5: Time Slot Assignment B
Frame
Second 0 Second 1 Second 13
Emitter .15 .25 .35 .5 .62 .75 .85 .8 .92
UAVv • •
GSv •
UAVl • • · · ·
GSl •
UAVt • •
GSt •
5.4 Dilution of Precision
Once decided the architecture of the communication network, a preliminary assessment
of the achievable performance must be done taking into account the propagation of
measurement errors due to the network geometry. Reference values of DOP can be
found in (123); annex D.1 offers a detailed formulation of DOP and a detailed analysis
of the lower bounds of DOP can be found in (124). With an optimum of 1, values under
5 could be considered as good DOP values, and values under 10 could be considered as
acceptable.
Figure 5.4: HDOP of the GS of the simulated scenario
Figure 5.4 shows the horizontal dilution of precision of a 2D model using only the
three ground stations of the envisaged simulation scenario. It could be observed as
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the obtained HDOP offer good values in a pseudo triangle with the GS as vertices.
Beyond the extension of the pseudo triangle the performance declines gradually up to
unacceptable values that are reached nearer in the vicinity of the GS than in between
GS.
(a) instant 1 (b) instant 2
Figure 5.5: HDOP using GS and air vehicles
Figures 5.5a and 5.5b shows the effect of including the measures of the range from
the air vehicles in two different instants of the simulation with the air vehicles in
different locations. The area with acceptable HDOP is bigger in than in figure 5.4 and
the values of the central area are lower (which represents better conditions).
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A great sailor can browse
though their sails are for hire.
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6
Relative Navigation Performance
Navigation is not considered as a problem for UAS as a multitude of techniques from the
conventional aviation could be employed in UAS. Nevertheless, navigation information
could be obtained from the datalink and could be considered as alternative to other
navigation means or as backup.
The navigation using information retrieved from the datalink is known as REL-
NAV. This technique obtains own aircraft position thanks to the known position of the
messages emitters and the ToF of these messages.
As in the case of the surveillance proposed in this PhD, there is a synergy between
communications and navigation thank to the employ of information retrieved from the
physical layer of the datalink. While in surveillance, the position is calculated with
the ToF measured in the different receivers for the messages emitted by the aircraft,
the navigation position is calculated with the ToF measured on board for the messages
emitted by different stations. Figure 6.1) shows how the direction of the message trip
is inverse to the direction of the messages employed in surveillance (see Figure 7.1).
The retrieved additional navigation data is independent form conventional navi-
gation means (e.g: DME, VOR) and also from satellite navigation means (e.g: GPS,
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Figure 6.1: Trilateration in RELNAV
GLONASS). This independence provides some additional characteristics:
• Resilience as the position could be computed from different emitters sets (e.g: fall
of an emitter).
• Flexibility as aircraft position could be calculated from different sets of emitters
with the same result.
• Adaptation as emitters distribution could be easily modified.
Own aircraft positioning by trilateration is not a new concept in aviation. It is
already performed with different radio navigation aids, as for example DME. The pro-
posal of using the radiofrequency spectrum already employed in the communication
datalink minimizes the radiofrequency employ as there is not additional requirement
for the interrogations and responses as in the DME systems.
The calculation of the Time of Flight of messages received onboard from different
emitters could provide navigation information. The employment of Signal of Opportu-
nity as source from positioning has been a subject of research in different telecommu-
nications scopes. (125) proposes a methodology for tracking in WLAN Location with
TOA Measurements.
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The use of communications in UAS as Signal of Opportunity for retrieving localiza-
tion data has been explored in (126) and (127). They propose a methodology to obtain
the localization of a faulty UAV thanks to the range measurements to the rest of UAVs
of the same multi-UAS flight. Assumes the capability to obtain a range measurement
from the UAV but does not consider the emissions of the ground control stations.
The Air Transportation system is migrating from a technology oriented approach
based on legacy systems as VOR, DME, ILS, SSR etc to a Performance based approach
where the performances to be fulfilled by the Air Transportation System in Communi-
cation (RCP), Navigation (RNP) and Surveillance (RSP) are defined and the support
technologies shall comply with. (128) offers the NASA overview of the Required Total
System Performance, its decomposition in RNP, RSP and RCP as well as the motiva-
tion of its adoption and the benefits that its adoption could provide.
This migration process applies to the legacy systems and technologies as well as the
upcoming systems and technologies. As example of Required Total System Performance
(RTSP) implications on legacy systems could be mentioned (129) where is analysed
the effect of the Required Total System Performance over the Short Term Collision
Avoidance Systems.
The prospective of the upcoming technologies and systems supporting current air-
crafts and operations are evaluated in (130), offering an overview of the Next Gen
ICNS Functional Requirements from the political and socio economic requirements to
the technologies passing by the RTSP and by the System Requirements (RSP, RCP
and RNP).
Another prospective effort must be done to integrate new kinds of aircrafts currently
under development as the UAS or the Very Light Jets (VLJ). (131) explains the results
of a study of the impact that new kind of vehicles could have over the National Air
Space (USA). The study concludes that the use of UAS for cargo hauling in remote
areas will not impact significantly. In this study are considered the requirement over
the air space but the advantages are not considered.
The transition from the current Air Transportation Systems to the Next Generation
system offers the chance to achieve the envisaged improvements in a more integrated
form. (132) analyses the Air-Ground Integration Challenges in NextGen, mentioning:
Air-ground Interoperability, Air-ground Information exchange, UAS Integration, and
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Mixed Performance. Among the key questions for the UAS integration could be high-
lighted the UAS interoperability and the Minimum Operational Performance Standard
(MOPS) for the data-link between pilot and aircraft.
Figure 6.2 shows in the same frame the simulated trajectories in black and the per-
formed trackings in blue for the traffic monitoring UAV (UAVt), green for the lifeguard
UAV (UAVl) and magenta for the vineyard UAV (UAVv).
Figure 6.2: Simulated Trajectories and performed trackings
6.1 Basic Scenario
The basic scenario proposed as reference for assessing the improvements achieved by
altering time slot allocations or visibilities are based on the visibility summarized in
table 5.1 and the time slot allocation of table 5.4.
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Along Track Error eat Figures 6.3a, 6.3b and 6.3c, show the eat in the tracking,
clearly under the RNP Accuracy performance required by the RNP APCH (0.3NM;
555m) shown in Table 1.1.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.3: eat, basic scenario
Figures 6.4a, 6.4b and 6.4c, show the error frequencies.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.4: eat frequencies, basic scenario
Table 6.1: eat Statistics, basic scenario
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 63.74 34.02 49.74
σeat 52.00 26.50 37.05
CDFeat(95%) 127.28 64.85 90.69
Table 6.1 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. UAVt has an along
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track error mean (eat) of 63.74 m with a standard deviation (σeat) of 52.00 m.
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is achieved
at a value of 127.28 m for the worst case (UAVt), which is in fact enough to comply with
the most restrictive navigation specification. For the case of the UAVl and the UAVv
trajectories, their lower σeat ensures also the compliance with the stringent navigation
specification (RNP APCH).
Cross Track Error ect Figures 6.5a, 6.5b and 6.5c, show the ect in the tracking. ect
remains under under the RNP Accuracy performance required by the RNP APCH
shown in table 1.1 (0.3 NM).
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.5: ect, basic scenario
Figures 6.6a, 6.6b and 6.6c, show the Error Frequencies.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.6: ect frequencies, basic scenario
The worst case of table 6.2, UAVv, has a ect of 22.79 m and a σect of 21.63 m. Using
the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is achieved at a value
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Table 6.2: ect Statistics, basic scenario
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 15.95 10.45 22.79
σect 16.09 8.16 21.63
CDFect(95%) 39.37 19.98 52.94
of 52.94 m for UAVv, which is (as for eat)enough to comply with the RNP APCH.
For the case of the UAVl and the UAVt trajectories, with lower σect the compliance
with RNP APCH is even improved.
Comparing the values of CDFect(95%) and CDFeat(95%) trajectory by trajectory,
it could be observed the improvement in the accuracy for the ect, which in fact is
the most critical between eat and ect. This better behaviour of ect with respect eat is
due mainly to the dynamic adjustment that the EKF makes using its Kalman gain to
minimize the variance. This adjustment produce position estimations aligned with the
trajectory.
UAVv takes advantage of this EKF dynamic adjustment as well as UAVt and UAVl,
but its continuous changes in the trajectory reverts in a smaller improvement in the
case of UAVv.
Integrity Figures 6.7a, 6.7b and 6.7c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.7: Integrity Diagrams
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The integrity values obtained does not achieved the required values for RNP 1
navigation specification.
Table 6.3: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Navigation Specification UAVt UAVl UAVv
RNP 10 0.59 0.75 0.98
RNAV 5 0.09 0.34 0.78
RNP 4 0.02 0.12 0.58
RNAV 2 0 0 0.01
Basic-RNP 1 0 0 0
RNP APCH 0 0 0
Table 6.3 shows the compliance with the navigation specifications of the different
trajectories. All the trajectories exceed the limits for RNAV and RNP.
6.2 Own Trajectory
Own trajectory scenario uses the visibility (table 5.1) and time slot assignment (table
5.4) of the basic scenario.
Own trajectory uses the own speed vector to modulate the EKF as explained in
4.5.3.2.
Along Track Error Figures 6.8a, 6.8b and 6.8c, show the eat in the tracking, clearly
under the RNP Accuracy performance required by the RNP APCH shown in Table
1.1.
Figures 6.9a, 6.9b and 6.9c, show the eat Frequencies.
Table 6.4 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. UAVt has an eat of
53.73 m with a σeat of 43.94 m.
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is achieved
at a value of 107.55 m for the worst case (UAVt), which is in fact enough to comply with
the most restrictive navigation specification. For the case of the UAVl and the UAVv
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.8: eat, Hybrid own trajectory
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.9: eat frequencies, Hybrid own trajectory
Table 6.4: eat Statistics, own trajectory
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 53.73 31.43 48.56
σeat 43.94 24.24 36.50
CDFeat(95%) 107.55 59.33 89.34
trajectories, their lower σeat ensures also the compliance with the stringent navigation
specification (RNP APCH).
Cross Track Error Figures 6.10a, 6.10b and 6.10c, show the ect in the tracking. ect
remains under the RNP Accuracy performance required by the RNP APCH shown
in Table 1.1.
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.10: ect, Hybrid own trajectory
Figures 6.11a, 6.11b and 6.11c, show the ect Frequencies.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.11: ect frequencies, Hybrid own trajectory
Table 6.5: ect Statistics, own trajectory
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 12.82 10.16 21.60
σect 9.24 7.70 20.73
CDFect(95%) 22.61 18.86 50.73
The worst case of table 6.5, the UAVv trajectory, has a ect of 21.60 m and a σect of
20.73 m. Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is
achieved at a value of 50.73 m for the worst case (UAVv), which is (as for eat)enough to
comply with the RNP APCH. For the case of the UAVt and the UAVl trajectories,
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with lower σect the compliance with RNP APCH is even improved.
Comparing the values of CDFect(95%) and CDFeat(95%) trajectory by trajectory,
it could be observed the improvement in the accuracy for the ect, which in fact is the
most critical between eat and ect.
Integrity Figures 6.12a, 6.12b and 6.12c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.12: Integrity Diagrams
The integrity values obtained does not achieved the required values for RNP 1
navigation specification.
Table 6.6: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Navigation Specification UAVt UAVl UAVv
RNP 10 0.66 0.79 0.98
RNAV 5 0.28 0.46 0.84
RNP 4 0.13 0.23 0.65
RNAV 2 0 0 0.01
Basic-RNP 1 0 0 0
RNP APCH 0 0 0
Table 6.6 shows the compliance with the navigation specifications of the different
trajectories. If there is an improvement comparing with table 6.3 in the percentages of
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compliance still all the trajectories exceed the limits of RNAV and RNP.
6.3 Overall Flight Intention
Overall scenario uses the visibility (table 5.1) and time slot assignment (table 5.4) of
the basic scenario.
Overall scenario uses the own speed vector and the speed vector of the rest of
participants to modulate the EKF as explained in 4.5.3.3.
Along Track Error Figures 6.13a, 6.13b and 6.13c, show the eat in the tracking,
clearly under the RNP Accuracy performance required by the RNP APCH shown in
Table 1.1.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.13: eat, Hybrid overall situation
Figures 6.14a, 6.14b and 6.14c, show the eat frequencies.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.14: eat frequencies, Hybrid overall situation
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Table 6.7: eat Statistics, overall situation
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 48.16 30.50 47.21
σeat 40.67 24.35 35.74
CDFeat(95%) 99.56 59.60 87.48
Table 6.7 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. UAVt has an eat of
48.16 m with a σeat of 40.67 m.
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is achieved
at a value of 99.56 m for the worst case (UAVt), which is in fact enough to comply with
the most restrictive navigation specification. For the case of the UAVl and the UAVv
trajectories, their lower σeat ensures also the compliance with the stringent navigation
specification (RNP APCH).
Cross Track Error Figures 6.15a, 6.15b and 6.15c, show the ect in the tracking. ect
remains under the RNP Accuracy performance required by the RNP APCH shown
in Table 1.1.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.15: ect, Hybrid overall situation
Figures 6.16a, 6.16b and 6.16c, show the ect Frequencies.
The worst case of table 6.8, the UAVv trajectory, has a ect of 20.22 m and a σect of
19.56 m. Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is
achieved at a value of 47.89 m for the worst case (UAVv), which is (as for eat)enough to
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.16: ect frequencies, Hybrid overall situation
Table 6.8: ect Statistics, overall situation
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 9.28 8.60 20.22
σect 6.62 6.61 19.56
CDFect(95%) 15.23 16.18 47.89
comply with the RNP APCH. For the case of the UAVt and the UAVl trajectories,
with lower σect the compliance with RNP APCH is even improved.
Comparing the values of CDFect(95%) and CDFeat(95%) trajectory by trajectory,
it could be observed the improvement in the accuracy for the ect, which in fact is the
most critical between eat and ect.
Integrity Figures 6.17a, 6.17b and 6.17c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
The integrity values obtained does not achieved the required values for RNP 1
navigation specification.
Table 6.9 shows the compliance with the navigation specifications of the different
trajectories. There is an improvement in all the percentages (with respect to table 6.6)
but still, all the trajectories exceed the limits of RNAV and RNP.
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.17: Integrity Diagrams
Table 6.9: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Navigation Specification UAVt UAVl UAVv
RNP 10 0.77 0.84 0.99
RNAV 5 0.62 0.61 0.88
RNP 4 0.57 0.45 0.72
RNAV 2 0 0 0.05
Basic-RNP 1 0 0 0
RNP APCH 0 0 0
6.4 Time Bias
Time Bias scenario uses the visibility (table 5.1) and time slot assignment (table 5.4)
of the basic scenario.
Time Bias scenario uses the own speed vector, the speed vector of the rest of par-
ticipants and their shared time bias to modulate the EKF as explained in 4.5.3.4.
Along Track Error Figures 6.18a, 6.18b and 6.18c, show the eat in the tracking,
clearly under the RNP Accuracy performance required by the RNP APCH shown in
Table 1.1.
Figures 6.19a, 6.19b and 6.19c, show the eat frequencies.
Table 6.10 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. UAVt has an eat of
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.18: eat, Time Bias situation
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.19: eat frequencies, Time Bias situation
Table 6.10: eat Statistics, Time Bias situation
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 24.96 12.17 9.80
σeat 20.53 10.20 7.55
CDFeat(95%) 50.24 24.96 18.47
24.96 m with a σeat of 20.53 m.
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is achieved
at a value of 50.24 m for the worst case (UAVt), which is in fact enough to comply with
the most restrictive navigation specification. For the case of the UAVl and the UAVv
trajectories, their lower σeat ensures also the compliance with the stringent navigation
specification (RNP APCH).
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Cross Track Error Figures 6.20a, 6.20b and 6.20c, show the ect in the tracking. ect
remains under the RNP Accuracy performance required by the RNP APCH shown
in Table 1.1.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.20: ect, Time Bias situation
Figures 6.21a, 6.21b and 6.21c, show the ect Frequencies.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.21: ect frequencies, Hybrid overall situation
Table 6.11: ect Statistics, Time Bias situation
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 7.59 4.93 6.40
σect 5.49 3.80 4.26
CDFect(95%) 13.45 9.30 10.43
The worst case of table 6.11, the UAVt trajectory, has a ect of 7.59 m and a σect of
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5.49 m. Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is
achieved at a value of 13.45 m for the worst case (UAVt), which is (as for eat)enough to
comply with the RNP APCH. For the case of the UAVl and the UAVv trajectories,
with lower σect the compliance with RNP APCH is even improved.
Comparing the values of CDFect(95%) and CDFeat(95%) trajectory by trajectory,
it could be observed the improvement in the accuracy for the ect, which in fact is the
most critical between eat and ect.
Integrity Figures 6.22a, 6.22b and 6.22c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.22: Integrity Diagrams
The integrity values obtained does not achieved the required values for RNP 1
navigation specification.
Table 6.12: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Navigation Specification UAVt UAVl UAVv
Basic-RNP 1 1 1 1
RNP APCH 0.98 0.99 1
Table 6.12 shows the compliance with the navigation specifications of the different
trajectories. It could be appreciated a dramatical improvement in the compliance in
all the trajectories that drive us to conclude that the control of the Time Bias becomes
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a crucial aspect of the PoCoLoCo methodology, independently of the means employed
to control this Time Bias.
6.4.1 Loquacity augmentation
Once achieved the target performance in both accuracy and integrity, it raises an inter-
esting question: What happens if the scenario is more loquacious than the presented
scenario?
This increment in the loquacity is assessed in two ways: by incrementing the number
of time slots per second that each user employs in one hand (Time Slot Assignment
B) and incrementing the number of users that each user could listen and consequently
employ for positioning in the other hand (Visibility Enhancement).
Seeking to be concise, the results of accuracy have been omitted in the next two sce-
narios. Both scenarios are compliant in accuracy terms and the accuracy analysis only
show slight improvements with respect the scenario Time Bias. Obviating this accuracy
results the assessment focus on the integrity improvement, where the improvements are
more significant.
6.4.1.1 Time Slot Assignment B
Time Slot Assignment B scenario uses the visibility (table 5.1) of the Basic Scenario
but uses the own speed vector, the speed vector of the rest of participants and their
shared time bias to modulate the EKF as explained in 4.5.3.4.
Time Slot Assignment B scenario changes the time slot assignment of basic scenario
(table 5.4) by another even more loquacious (table 5.5).
Figures 6.23a, 6.23b and 6.23c, show the error against the protection level calculated
by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
The integrity values obtained does achieve the required values for RNP 1 navigation
specification and almost achieve the required performance for RNP APCH.
Table 6.13 shows the compliance with the navigation specifications of the different
trajectories. It could be appreciated a slight improvement in the compliance of RNP
APCH.
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.23: Integrity Diagrams
Table 6.13: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Navigation Specification UAVt UAVl UAVv
Basic-RNP 1 1 1 1
RNP APCH 0.99 0.99 1
6.4.1.2 Visibility Enhancement
Once assessed the confidence values achievable with the visibilities of table 5.1, an
improved version of the communications has been simulated to asses the effect on the
confidence level of a richer scenario. The richer scenario, summarized by table 5.2, has
the capability to receive messages from any of the other network user instead of the
reduced set of table 5.1.
Figures 6.24a, 6.24b and 6.24c, show the error against the protection level calculated
by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
The inclusion in the EKF of pseudorange measurements coming from more users
gives us a better DOP value. This improvement could be observed graphically by
comparing figure 5.4 (where only the GS are considered for computing the DOP) with
figures 5.5a or 5.5b (where the GS and the UAV are considered for computing the
DOP). This better DOP values benefit the three trajectories but the improvement is
better seen in the case of UAVt (fig. 6.24a) and UAVl (fig. 6.24b) that now complies
even with RNP APCH.
Table 6.14 shows the compliance with the navigation specifications of the different
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 6.24: Integrity Diagrams
Table 6.14: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Navigation Specification UAVt UAVl UAVv
Basic-RNP 1 1 1 1
RNP APCH 1 1 1
trajectories. It could be appreciated how UAVt, UAVl and UAVv complies now with
RNP APCH. This significant improvement with respect the shown in table 6.12 is
achieved without increasing the data throughput of each user (as it was the case of
table 6.13), only taking advantage of the communications of additional users.
This interesting result could be summarized from the point of view of the relative
navigation as the more crowded is the scenario, it becomes safer.
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There is nothing better hidden
than what is in sight.
Anonymous
7
Relative Surveillance Performance
The expected contribution in Surveillance is to show a surveillance alternative to the
conventional surveillance techniques (PSR, SSR, ADS).
This contribution is based on the capacity to compute the ToF of the messages
exchanged trough a datalink. The position of the aircraft is obtained by trilateration
using the ToF to compute approximate distances from different stations.
Figure 7.1 shows how different Time of Flight for the same message received at
different receivers could be employed to calculate the position of the UAS. This is an
information already existent in the physical layer that is employed in the application
layer.
The surveillance information obtained by this technique is independent from the
conventional surveillance sources (PSR, SSR), as well as the positioning data obtained
from navigation means based on satellite constellations (GPS, GLONASS). This inde-
pendence provides some additional characteristics:
• Resilience, as aircraft position (track) could be calculated from different sets of
receivers.
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Figure 7.1: Multilateration in relative Surveillance
• Flexibility, as aircraft position (track) calculation could change between different
sets of receivers.
• Adaptation, as could be easily reconfigured to different implementations on the
ground.
The extension of the RELNAV concept to the multilateration, by using the commu-
nication link as source for ToF, represents a synergy opportunity as surveillance data is
obtained without requiring adding radiofrequency spectrum employ. The capability to
obtain tracking capacities through the communications is aligned with the surveillance
strategy of Eurocontrol (133) and does not requires additional spectrum (in addition
to the employed in communications) which is one of the problems presented in (134)
and detailed in (135).
For surveillance purposes it is assumed that each GS measures the pseudorange be-
tween GS itself and each UAV. Those pseudoranges are then shared through a network
and the position of each UAV are computed using pseudoranges to the same aircraft
obtained from different GS. This positioning could be performed by the GS of the UAV
or by a centralized facility, depending on criteria of the system designer for the selected
architecture.
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The accuracy of the positioning is assessed with the thresholds proposed by (62)
and (63), showing the error by components eat and ect maintaining an analogy with the
navigation results shown in chapter 6. This is done in despite of the ICAO requirements,
which are stated in linear distance between actual position and calculated position, to
better analyse the performance of the methodology. As in the case of relative navigation
of chapter 6, the surveillance data presents an asymmetric behaviour depending on the
direction of the measurement of the error (eat and ect). Showing the performance
divided into its components allows us to better describe the behaviour obtained.
It should be taken into consideration that (63) specifies a measurement interval of
5 seconds for NM, while recommend 4 seconds interval. In our PoCoLoCo proposal,
the measurement update interval is 1 second, improving significantly the required per-
formance.
The integrity threshold for Surveillance is not specified in (62) nor in (63), so it has
been selected the values of the separation (3NM and 5NM). These references allows us
to show the effect of different error estimation, specially esynch, in the computation of a
protection level in spite of the lack of a standard value and maintains an analogy with
the chapter 6.
7.1 Basic Scenario
The basic scenario proposed as reference for assessing the improvements achieved by
altering time slot allocations is based on the visibility summarized in table 5.3 and the
time slot allocation of table 5.4.
Along Track Error eat Figures 7.2b and 7.2c, show an eat under the required by
EUROCONTROL (Table 1.2) in the 3NM separation (330m). In fact, it even complies
with the recommended value of 230m.
Figure 7.2a shows the performance obtained by the UAVt which does not com-
ply with the performance required by EUROCONTROL in the 3NM separation and
scarcely complies with the performance required in the 5NM separation.
Figures 7.3b and 7.3c, show the eat frequencies of the UAVl and the UAVv and how
both are under the 230m recommended by EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation.
Figure 7.3a shows the eat frequency of the UAVt and how does not complies with the
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.2: eat, basic scenario
performance required by EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation (330m), neither
with the recommended performance for the 5NM separation (350m).
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.3: eat frequencies, basic scenario
Table 7.1: eat Statistics, basic scenario
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 315.51 77.55 42.30
σeat 236.69 61.24 32.03
CDFeat(95%) 578.86 149.90 78.40
Table 7.1 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. σeat is under the values
required by the Lincoln Laboratory (table 1.2 ) with the premise that the eat is bigger
than the ect, which will be seen next.
118
7.1 Basic Scenario
The accuracy (95%) of the UAVl and the UAVv comply with the required by EURO-
CONTROL for the 3NM separation but this is not the case for the Traffic monitoring.
Traffic monitoring has an along track mean (eat) of 315.51 m with a standard deviation
(σeat) of 236.69 m.
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is achieved
at a value of 578.86 m for the worst case (UAVt), which is beyond the 550 m required
by EUROCONTROL for the 5NM separation.
Cross Track Error ect Figures 7.4a, 7.4b and 7.4c, show the how the ect has similar
behaviour than the eat but with better values. Figures 7.4b and 7.4c show how the
UAVl and the UAVv are clearly under the 230m recommended by EUROCONTROL
for the 3NM. In the other hand figure 7.4a shows how the UAVt does not complies
neither with the 3NM required accuracy neither with the recommended value for 5NM.
Taking into consideration that the 550m required by EUROCONTROL for the 5NM
are in fact the module of the eat and the ect it does not complies neither with the
required performance.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.4: ect, basic scenario
Figures 7.5a, 7.5b and 7.5c, show the ect frequencies. The UAVl and the UAVv (fig-
ures 7.5b and 7.5c) show an improvement with respect to the eat frequencies remaining
under the required values by EUROCONTROL. The UAVt (figure 7.5a) shows a big
improvement with respect to the eat but still remains a long (and thin) queue that goes
beyond the required values for the 3NM separation.
The σect table 7.2 show values under the 370m required by the Lincoln Laboratory
for the UAVt, UAVl and UAVv. For the case of the Traffic shall be kept in mind that
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.5: ect frequencies, basic scenario
Table 7.2: ect Statistics, basic scenario
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 116.83 21.63 16.04
σect 63.33 19.49 13.84
CDFect(95%) 155.01 47.70 33.87
the σeat was already beyond the required performance, making the value of σect not
valid.
The worst case of table 7.2, the UAVt trajectory, has a ect of 116.83 m and a σect
of 63.33 m. Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy
is achieved at a value of 155.01 for the worst case (UAVt), which is enough to comply
with the performance required by EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation. For the
case of the UAVl and the UAVv trajectories, with lower σect the compliance with the
3NM separation is even improved.
Comparing the values of CDFect(95%) and CDFeat(95%) trajectory by trajectory,
it could be observed the improvement in the accuracy for the ect, which in fact is the
most critical between eat and ect. Nevertheless, the required performance by EURO-
CONTROL is the linear error not their components. As the eat was already beyond
the limits, it remains beyond the limits.
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Integrity Figures 7.6a, 7.6b and 7.6c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.6: Integrity Diagrams
The integrity values obtained are beyond the alarm thresholds established for 5NM
separation, except in the case of UAVv.
Table 7.3: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Required Separation UAVt UAVl UAVv
5NM 0 0 1
3NM 0 0 0
Table 7.3 shows the percentage of compliance with the separation requirements
performed by the different trajectories. All the trajectories exceed the limits of 3NM
and only UAVv, that benefits from a specially good DOP during the entire trajectory,
complies with 5NM.
7.2 Own Trajectory
Own trajectory scenario uses the visibility (table 5.3) and time slot assignment (table
5.4) of the basic scenario.
Own trajectory uses the own speed vector to modulate the EKF as explained in
4.5.3.2.
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Along Track Error eat Figures 7.7a and 7.7c, show how the eat of UAVt and UAVv
comply with the required by EUROCONTROL for 3NM separation (Table 1.2).
Figure 7.7b shows how the UAVl complies with the performance required by EU-
ROCONTROL for the 5NM (< 550m) separation but does not complies with its rec-
ommendation for the 5NM separation (< 350m).
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.7: eat, Hybrid own trajectory
Figures 7.8a, 7.8b and 7.8c, show the how the Error Frequencies of the UAVt has
been significantly improved whilst the frequencies of both UAVl and UAVv have a
longer tail that offers poorer performance.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.8: eat frequencies, Hybrid own trajectory
Table 7.4 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. UAVt improves their
positioning accuracy whilst the UAVl and UAVv achieve poorer performance. σeat of
UAVt, UAVl and UAVv are in line with the accuracy required by the Lincoln Laboratory
and the horizontal position error of the traffic and the vineyard comply with the required
by EUROCONTROL.
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Table 7.4: eat Statistics, own trajectory
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 299.00 73.21 40.39
σeat 223.96 57.32 31.04
CDFeat(95%) 548.19 140.30 75.99
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12 for the UAVt, the required 95 % of
accuracy is achieved at a value of 548.19 m, which is beyond the required by EURO-
CONTROL for the 3NM separation (330 m) as well as beyond the recommendation for
the 5NM separation (< 350m).
Cross Track Error ect Figures 7.9a, 7.9b and 7.9c, show how the ect achieve poorer
results than in the basic scenario; in the case of for UAVt and UAVl, going beyond the
requirement of EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation. ect of UAVv still complies
with the EUROCONTROL requirements but increases is magnitude significantly.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.9: ect, Hybrid own trajectory
Figures 7.10a, 7.10b and 7.10c, show how Error Frequencies achieves poorer results
in the case of the Lifeguard and the Vineyard and only improves the positioning of the
UAVt.
Table 7.5 shows how the σct of the UAVt, the UAVl and the UAVv comply with
the Lincoln Laboratoy Requirement. The EUROCONTROL requirement for 3NM
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.10: ect frequencies, Hybrid own trajectory
Table 7.5: ect Statistics, own trajectory
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 110.57 21.24 14.60
σect 58.57 18.49 12.73
CDFect(95%) 143.36 45.25 31.17
separation is achieved by the UAVt, UAVl and the UAVv. Nevertheless, the poor
performance obtained in eat by UAVt discards it use.
Integrity Figures 7.11a, 7.11b and 7.11c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.11: Integrity Diagrams
The integrity values obtained are beyond the alarm thresholds except in the case
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of UAVv for 5NM.
Table 7.6: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Required Separation UAVt UAVl UAVv
5NM 0 0 1
3NM 0 0 0
Table 7.6 shows the percentage of compliance with the separation requirements
performed by the different trajectories. As in the Basic Scenario, all the trajectories
exceed the limits of 3NM and only UAVv, that benefits from a specially good DOP
during the entire trajectory, complies with 5NM.
7.3 Overall Flight Intention
Overall Flight Intention scenario uses the visibility (table 5.3) and time slot assignment
(table 5.4) of the basic scenario.
Overall Flight Intention scenario uses the own speed vector and the speed vector of
the rest of participants to modulate the EKF as explained in 4.5.3.3.
Along Track Error eat Figures 7.12a, 7.12b and 7.12c, show the eat in the tracking,
clearly under the Accuracy performance required by EUROCONTROL for the 3NM
separation.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.12: eat, Hybrid overall
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Figures 7.13a, 7.13b and 7.13c show the Error Frequencies of UAVt, UAVl and
UAVv.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.13: eat frequencies, Hybrid overall
Table 7.7: eat Statistics, Hybrid overall
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 299.00 73.21 40.39
σeat 223.96 57.32 31.05
CDFeat(95%) 548.19 140.30 75.99
Table 7.7 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. σeat is under the values
required by the Lincoln Laboratory (table 1.2 ) with the premise that the eat is bigger
than the ect, which will be seen next.
The accuracy (95%) of the UAVl and the UAVv comply with the required by EU-
ROCONTROL for the 3NM separation (< 330m) as well as for its recommendation
(< 230m).
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is achieved
at a value of 548.19 m for the worst case (UAVt), which goes beyond the required by
EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation.
Cross Track Error ect Figures 7.14a, 7.14b and 7.14c, show the ect in the tracking,
clearly under the Accuracy performance required by EUROCONTROL for the 3NM
separation, improving even the accuracies of eat.
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.14: ect, Hybrid overall
Figures 7.15a, 7.15b and 7.15c, show the ect frequencies of UAVt, UAVl and UAVv.
It is significant the improvement with respect to the eat frequencies of this scenario.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.15: ect frequencies, Hybrid overall
Table 7.8: ect Statistics, Hybrid overall
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 110.57 21.24 14.60
σect 58.57 18.49 12.73
CDFect(95%) 146.36 45.25 31.17
Table 7.8 summarizes the basic statistics of the ect module. σect is under the values
required by the Lincoln Laboratory (table 1.2 ) complying with the premise that the
eat is bigger than the ect.
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The accuracy (95%) of the UAVt, UAVl and the UAVv comply with the required by
EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation (< 330m) as well as for its recommendation
(< 230m).
Integrity Figures 7.16a, 7.16b and 7.16c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.16: Integrity Diagrams
The integrity values obtained are beyond 5NM required separation for all the tra-
jectories with the exception of UAVv
Table 7.9: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Required Separation UAVt UAVl UAVv
5NM 0 0 1
3NM 0 0 0
Table 7.9 shows the percentage of compliance with the separation requirements
performed by the different trajectories. As in the Basic Scenario and the Hybridized
with own trajectory scenario, all the trajectories exceed the limits of 3NM and only
UAVv, that benefits from a specially good DOP during the entire trajectory, complies
with 5NM.
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7.4 Time Bias
Time Bias scenario uses the visibility (table 5.3) and time slot assignment (table 5.4)
of the basic scenario.
Time Bias scenario uses the own speed vector, the speed vector of the rest of par-
ticipants and their shared time bias to modulate the EKF as explained in 4.5.3.4.
The improvement on the positioning achieved thanks to the use of the clock biases
is as big that the scale of the error has been changed from 0 m to 600 m in the previous
surveillance graphics to 0 m to 100 m.
Along Track Error eat Figures 7.17a, 7.17b and 7.17c, show the eat in the tracking,
clearly under the Accuracy performance required by EUROCONTROL for the 3NM
separation.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.17: eat, Time Bias
Figures 7.18a, 7.18b and 7.18c show the Error Frequencies of UAVt, UAVl and
UAVv.
Table 7.10: eat Statistics, Time Bias
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 41.32 16.63 9.15
σeat 49.26 14.48 7.00
CDFeat(95%) 120.59 35.43 17.13
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.18: eat frequencies, Time Bias
Table 7.10 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. σeat is under the values
required by the Lincoln Laboratory (table 1.2 ) with the premise that the eat is bigger
than the ect, which will be seen next.
The accuracy (95%) of the UAVt, UAVl and the UAVv comply with the required by
EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation (< 330m) as well as for its recommendation
(< 230m).
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12, the required 95 % of accuracy is achieved
at a value of 120.59 m for the worst case (UAVt), which complies with the required by
EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation.
Cross Track Error ect Figures 7.19a, 7.19b and 7.19c, show the ect in the tracking,
clearly under the Accuracy performance required by EUROCONTROL for the 3NM
separation, improving even the accuracies of eat.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.19: ect, Time Bias
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Figures 7.20a, 7.20b and 7.20c, show the ect frequencies of UAVt, UAVl and UAVv.
It is significant the improvement with respect to the eat frequencies of this scenario.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.20: ect frequencies, Time Bias
Table 7.11: ect Statistics, Time Bias
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 6.99 4.29 6.09
σect 21.26 3.03 4.50
CDFect(95%) 52.03 7.43 11.02
Table 7.11 summarizes the basic statistics of the ect module. σect is under the values
required by the Lincoln Laboratory (table 1.2 ) complying with the premise that the
eat is bigger than the ect.
The accuracy (95%) of the UAVt, UAVl and the UAVv comply with the required by
EUROCONTROL for the 3NM separation (< 330m) as well as for its recommendation
(< 230m).
Integrity Figures 7.21a, 7.21b and 7.21c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
The integrity values obtained are under the alarm thresholds of 3NM.
Table 7.12 shows the percentage of compliance with the separation requirements
performed by the different trajectories. Comparing with tables 7.3, 7.6 and 7.9 could
be appreciated a dramatical improvement: all the trajecctories comply not only with
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.21: Integrity Diagrams
Table 7.12: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Required Separation UAVt UAVl UAVv
5NM 1 1 1
3NM 1 1 1
5NM but even with 3NM separation. As in the case of navigation, the control of the
Time Bias of the participants drives to a dramatical improvement in the integrity.
7.4.1 Loquacity augmentation
The enhancement on the surveillance retrieved from increasing the number of measure
(i.e: by adding time slots allocation to each participant) is assessed simulating the same
visibility than in the basic scenario (table 5.1) but increasing the number of time slots
as summarized by table 5.5.
The enhancement on the surveillance retrieved from the improvement on the visi-
bility (i.e: using measures from more actors) has not been evaluated. With the current
simulation configuration, the augmentation of the number of actors reporting measures
in surveillance implies the use of pseudoranges measured from UAV and its propagation
through the radio network. This measures from UAV to UAV complicate the algorithm
as it requires an additional set of messages for sharing the measures. It also introduces
bigger delays between the measure and the employ of the measures that should be
considered for a proper simulation.
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7.4.1.1 Time Slot Assignment B
Time Slot Assignment B scenario uses the visibility (table 5.1) of the Basic Scenario
and its situational awareness knowledge.
Time Slot Assignment B scenario changes the time slot assignment of basic scenario
(table 5.4) by another even more loquacious (table 5.5).
Along Track Error eat Figures 7.22b and 7.22c, show how the eat of the UAVt,
UAVl and the UAVv complies with the performance required by EUROCONTROL for
3NM separation (Table 1.2).
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.22: eat, Time Slot allocation B
Figures 7.23a, 7.23b and 7.23c, show the how the Error Frequencies have distribu-
tions similar to the basic scenario but with the eat nearer to 0.
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.23: eat frequencies, Time Slot allocation B
Table 7.13 summarizes the basic statistics of the eat module. UAVt, UAVl and
UAVv improves their positioning accuracies with respect the accuracy results of the
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Table 7.13: eat Statistics, Time Slot allocation B
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
eat 29.93 10.70 7.93
σeat 42.37 8.78 6.20
CDFeat(95%) 103.71 21.48 15.17
Time Bias scenario (see table 7.10) in both eat and σeat for the three trajectories. σeat
is in line with the accuracy required by the Lincoln Laboratory and the eat of the UAVt,
UAVl and the UAVv comply with the required by EUROCONTROL.
Using the Rayleigh CDF of equation C.12 for the Traffic, the required 95 % of
accuracy is achieved at a value of 103.71 m, complying with the required by EURO-
CONTROL for the 3NM separation (330m).
Cross Track Error ect Figures 7.24b and 7.24c, show the ect of UAVt, UAVl and
UAVv in the tracking, which comply with accuracy performance required by the EU-
ROCONTROL for 3NM separation (table 1.1).
(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.24: ect, Time Slot allocation B
Figures 7.25a, 7.25b and 7.25c, show the ect frequencies, which have similar patterns
that in the basic scenario with the values nearer to 0. This displacement to 0 reflects
the improvement in the positioning.
Table 7.14 shows how the UAVt, UAVl and UAVv comply with the Lincoln Labo-
ratory requirement (table 1.2).
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.25: ect frequencies, Time Slot allocation B
Table 7.14: ect Statistics, Time Slot allocation B
Trajectory
Statistic UAVt UAVl UAVv
ect 7.04 4.29 6.07
σect 21.25 3.03 4.49
CDFect(95%) 52.02 7.41 11.00
For the accuracy requirements of EUROCONTROL in 3NM, UAVt, UAVl and
UAVv comply largely.
Comparing the values of CDFect(95%) and CDFeat(95%) trajectory by trajectory,
it could be observed the improvement in the accuracy for the ect, which in fact is the
most critical between eat and ect. Comparing the values of accuracy of tables 7.11 and
7.14 there are not significant improvements in ectbetween Time Bias scenario and Time
slot B scenario (which in fact is Time Bias with additional time slots). Nevertheless,
considering as a set the eat and ect there is a significant improvement in the accuracy.
Integrity Figures 7.26a, 7.26b and 7.26c, show the error against the protection level
calculated by the Kalman Filter from the noise models.
The integrity values obtained are under the alarm thresholds of 3NM, presenting
an aspect similar to the figures 7.21a, 7.21b and 7.21c of the Time Bias scenario.
Table 7.15 shows the compliance with the required separation of the different tra-
jectories. As in table 7.12, all the trajectories comply with the 3NM separation.
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(a) UAVt (b) UAVl (c) UAVv
Figure 7.26: Integrity Diagrams
Table 7.15: Integrity Alarm Values Compliance
Trajectory
Required Separation UAVt UAVl UAVv
5NM 1 1 1
3NM 1 1 1
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My happiness consist in appreciate what I have
and do not desire excessively what I do not have.
Lev Nikolaievich Tolstoi 1818 - 1910
8
Discussion
This work presents PoCoLoCo, a methodology to use the high rate of UAS communica-
tions as a secondary means for both navigation and surveillance. The feasibility of using
the C3 communications, between each air vehicle and its own ground station, as signal
of opportunity for navigation and surveillance, has been tested in a reasonably future
scenario. In this scenario three different UAS perform a different state or civil mission,
with their own flight plan. Assuming flight works are performed concurrently in a same
geographic area, most of their signals are visible to the others, allowing multilateration
for positioning. The selected scenario is modest for the achieved result: More UAS
or/and higher communication rates than the ones proposed will improve accuracy and
integrity of the PoCoLoCo. Nevertheless, the results achieved with the selected sce-
nario show enough accuracy and integrity to be used in RNP 1 navigation and in 3NM
surveillance. These achievements are obtained using only the radio frequency spectrum
that UAS require for their C3. The envisaged UAS communication signals were shared
with the rest of the actors to obtain navigation and/or surveillance information, being
a clear example of the potential behind the research in CNS integration
The message time of arrival in a TDMA network has been employed to measure the
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distances between the receiver and the emitters. After enhancing these measures with
information propagated through the network, a fault free solution has been obtained
using an extended Kalman filter. Comparing the actual position in the simulation with
the positioning solution offered by the EKF, the obtained error has an accuracy better
than the 1 NM limit proposed by Eurocontrol for the stringent RNP spaces or the 3NM
required by EUROCONTROL in surveillance.
The propagation of the clock bias calculated by each user has shown to be the most
effective contribution to the error reduction in the positioning of the rest of users. This
propagation becomes critical when referring to integrity values. The reduction of the
variance associated to the measures conduces to a smaller protection level that complies
with the requirements.
The simulation presented achieves the required values of integrity in RNP 1 in
navigation with a reasonable distribution of a reduced number of GS over the terri-
tory. This integrity values are improved when additional measures are employed in the
calculation, approaching the number and kind of measures to a more realistic scenario.
The positioning analysed for the UAS offers a navigation and surveillance services
redundant with the conventional navigation and surveillance systems. The accuracies
analysed are obtained from a reduced set of simulated UAS, but are not exclusive for
UAS. The rest of users of the airspace could also obtain navigation positioning if they
are able to listen the messages of the network i.e: they have access to the network
and are synchronized. The rest of users could also be surveyed with the premise of
participating actively in the network i.e: exchanging messages through the network
with a similar periodicity.
Surveillance has been simulated with a more restricted scenario (pseudorange mea-
sured only from the GS) than in Navigation (pseudoranges measured from a mix of
GS and UAV), resulting in poorer results. The pseudorange measurement from UAV
to UAV in surveillance has been discarded as it increases necessarily the number of
messages exchanged through the radio and increases the complexity of the datalink
protocols and the positioning.
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8.1 Future Works
The obtained results are interesting as they show a performance acceptable for both
navigation and surveillance. Nevertheless, this results must be taken with precaution
as they are at the initial stages of development.
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 Where are we going?
Figure 8.1: Technology Readiness Levels
Taking as reference the figure 8.1, we are proving partially the feasibility of the
concept, i.e: TRL2 or TRL3. This concept could still be improved by different ways
that should also be verified.
Once this feasibility has been proven, there is still a long way to travel since the
TRL2 or TRL3 to the TRL9 which is achieved with the entry into service of the
technology.
8.1.1 Technology Development
Future works should focus on more realistic environmental conditions, including simu-
lation of multipath effects as well as the troposphere effect to adapt the known methods
to the specificity of the relative navigation in contrast with the GPS. Regarding the
estimation methodology, different alternatives to the EKF should be assessed, e.g:the
family of Gaussian filters, who shows a better behaviour in front of non-linearities.
An interesting concern is the assessment of the effects on the final positioning that
the endogamic reuse of the EKF computed navigation through the network could create.
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The effect of employing less accurate positioning means at the rest of users (e.g:
trilateration from multiple DME or positioning with DME and VOR) is an interesting
point of study as it could be representative of the transition from the current navigation
system.
the use of multiple directional antennae could improve the reception offering at the
same time a measurement of azimuth in addition to the distance retrieved from the
TOA. The azimuth additional information could ameliorate the geometry leading to
a significant improvement in the integrity values, specially in scenarios with a small
number of users.
Focusing on the evolution of the technological aspects, the localization analysed in
this work is possible thanks to the synchronism of the different actors (air vehicles,
ground stations...). The way this synchronization is achieved constitutes a really inter-
esting field of research, including the use of CSAC, use of GNSS for synchronism, time
protocols on the network... etc
The effect that the correlation accuracy has on the positioning could be important
and it depends on the specific frequencies and antennae technologies employed. This
effect should be assessed, using the frequencies allocated by the ITU to the control and
command of the UAS, once such allocation occurs.
Taking into account the reduced computational requirements (the entire simulation,
including data generation of one day and the subsequent navigation for the three UAS,
takes less than 5 minutes in a small computer), the employ of the navigation algorithm
in real time does not implies performances risks.
8.1.2 Readiness Improvement
Increasing the readiness of the technology since the TRL2 or TRL3, implies that the
technology must be developed (TRL3, TRL4 and TRL5)and demonstrated (TRL5 and
TRL6). This demonstration implies going beyond the simulations and its use in the
real world.
The loquacity of the communications has a side effect in the separation of UAS. In
one hand, the flight crew of a UAS is not longer on board, precluding the assumption
of the Self Separation, and Collision avoidance(both cooperative and non-cooperative)
by the human flight crew.
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Figure 8.2: Separation and Collision Avoidance Mechanisms in UAS
In the other hand, the loquacity of the communications reduces the time between
position updates increasing the quality of the situational awareness available. Reducing
the time elapsed between position updates gives the chance to implement some sepa-
ration and collision avoidance mechanism outside the aircraft, as presented by figure
8.2.
This flexibility could allow new distributions of the aircraft functions; the classical
separation between Surveillance (which is performed outside the aircraft by the ANSP)
and See & Avoid (which is performed on board by the flight crew) is no longer as rigid
as presented in fig 2.12, allowing several distributions of the functionalities. Among the
new distributions could be found the use of surveillance data for Sense & Avoid use.
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Figure 8.3: PoCo LoCo verification through flight inspection
Increasing the TRL of the concept will require to evolve from the current simulations
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to perform actual flight tests. Figure 8.3 summarizes the required architecture required
for performing flight inspections of Radio Navigation Aids or Radars using UAS instead
of conventional aircraft. The feasibility of such architecture and operations has been
already explored by ICARUS research group ((136), (137), (138), (139)) setting the
foundations for an applied work in the future.
The localization offered by PoCoLoCo requires the measure of pseudoranges from
different known positions. From a point of view of the deployed architecture, this could
be achieved by using a monolithic network where all the participants are synchronized or
it could also be obtained with pseudorange measures coming from different networks.
The monolithic network seems to offers more quality guarantee whilst the option of
the different networks seems to offer a bigger flexibility. This architecture differences
offers an interesting field of research to adjust the final implementation to the required
characteristics not only from the accuracy and integrity perspectives but also from the
security point of view.
The scenario employed for the simulation assumes a constant presence of UAS
during the 24h of a day. If PoCoLoCo must offer positioning services to the rest of users
of the airspace the assumption of the number of UAS operations shall be revisited (even
if the number of operations considered has been deliberately kept at a low number).
Alternatives as the use of fixed ground infrastructure must be analysed with different
levels of confidence on the pseudorange depending on the quality of the actor.
The interaction with the state aircraft must be taken into account. Security concerns
could impose some restrictions on the propagation of the aircraft state position. A
commercial implementation should deal with different levels of collaboration. The
impact of these differences must be assessed at different levels, including the positioning
solution as well as the message catalogue.
The relative positions of the GS and the different trajectories affects notably to the
positioning accuracy. In a commercial implementation, positioning performance could
be guaranteed by ensuring the presence of some actors in a perimetral distribution that
benefits from a good geometry.
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God sometimes geometrizes.
Plato (427 bC - 347 bC)
A
Linearization
Kalman filter could be seen as a solver methodology for systems of linear equations. In
the case of estimating positions through the trilateration of distances this linearity is
not fulfilled. Equation A.1 shows the euclidean distance in 2 dimensions, base of the
problem and far from being linear.
di =
√
x2 + y2 (A.1)
Obtaining pseudorange measurements from different stations receiving a message
from the surveyed aircraft, and applying equation A.1 results a system of equations
with 2 variables (x, y) for each pseudorange obtained from ground stations as seen in
A.2.
ρa '
√
(xa − xt)2 + (ya − yt)2
ρb '
√
(xb − xt)2 + (yb − yt)2
· · ·
ρn '
√
(xn − xt)2 + (yn − yt)2 (A.2)
Those equations have the problematics of its lack of linearity. The complex reso-
lution of such no linear equations makes preferable the use of linear approximations
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that allows the use of simpler resolutions methods. One of the most commons ways for
linearisation a function is the approximation to its behaviour around a point with the
Taylor’s theorem (equation A.3). Note the Multi index notation that simplifies the use
of multiple variables in the same formula.
fx =
n∑
|α|=0
1
α!
∂αf(a)
∂xα
(x− a)α +
∑
|α|=n+1
Rα(x)(x− a)α (A.3)
In our case, the approximation is kept to the first degree in order (equation A.4) to
obtain a system of linear equations:
fx ' fx0 +
dfx0
dx
∆x (A.4)
the partial derivatives (equation A.4) of the euclidean distance formula A.1 results
inA.5:
∂D
∂x
' 1
2
(
(x− xa)2 + (y − ya)2
)−1
2
2 (x− xa)→ (x− xa)√
(x− xa)2 + (y − ya)2
→ (x− xa)
ρa
(A.5)
and similarly for y A.5:
∂D
∂y
' (y − ya)
ρa
(A.6)
In Figure A.1 could be observed the transformation performed with Taylor’s theo-
rem. The resulting function approaches the original one in a region with some differ-
ences (∆x and ∆y). Coming back to the 2 dimensions the result of our linearization
becomes A.7:
ρi ' ρio +
(x− xi)
ρio
∆x+
(y − yi)
ρi0
∆y (A.7)
where:
• ρi is a measurement of the distance obtained from our system.
• ρi0 is an estimation of the distance.
• (x−xi)ρi0 and
(y−yi)
ρi0
are components of the unitary vector from station to the track
• ∆x and ∆y are corrections to the estimated position required to convert them
into the real position.
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Figure A.1: Linearization scheme
Grouping ρi and ρi0 which are measurement and the estimation of the measurement
results A.8:
ρi − ρi0 ' +
(x− xi)
ρi0
∆x+
(y − yi)
ρi0
∆y (A.8)
Assuming this formulation for each pair station-track is obtained an overdimensioned
system of linear equations that could be represented in matrix nomenclature A.9: ρ1 − ρ10...
ρn − ρn0
 '

x0−x1
ρ10
y0−y1
ρ10
...
...
x0−xn
ρn0
y0−yn
ρn0
 [ ∆x∆y
]
Y ' H X
(A.9)
Where:
• Y is the matrix of differences between observed and predicted distances
• H is the geometry matrix who contains the unitary vector of the lines relying the
stations with the track (see fig. A.2 for a geometric interpretation).
• X is the matrix containing the differences between estimated positions and real
positions.
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Figure A.2: Matrix H Geometric Interpretation
Which in fact is the opposite to what are we searching a function that provides
an estimation of the position of the track using the measurements of the distances as
input.
Y = HXˆ
HTY = HTHXˆ(
HTH
)−1
HTY =
(
HTH
)−1
HTHXˆ(
HTH
)−1
HTY = IXˆ
Xˆ =
(
HTH
)−1
HTY (A.10)
Equation A.10 allows the track position computation with linear numeric analysis tech-
niques.
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C.G.J.Jacobi, (1804 1851)
B
Extended Kalman Filter
One classical approach for navigation with noisy sources is the use of Kalman filters for
estimating the position reducing the error. The Kalman Filter was introduced in (140)
Kalman filter estimates the state of a system controlled in discrete time described
equation B.1:
Xt = AXt−1 +But + wt−1 (B.1)
where the current state Xt is obtained through the dynamic equation A from the
previous state Xt−1 plus a control signal u who modifies the state as represented by B
and a noise wt−1 which is the error of the process. from this state equation it could be
observed through an observation equation B.2:
Yt = HXt + vt (B.2)
where the observation vector Yt is a function H of the state vector Xt plus a noise
vt from the measurement. Both process and measurement noises are assumed to be
independents between them with a normal distribution of its probability B.3.
p(w) ' N(0, Q)
p(v) ' N(0, R) (B.3)
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A kalman Filter is organized in two phases:
• Time update or Predict
• measurement update or correct
B.1 Time update or predict
The time update or predict phase uses the filter to provide a noiseless estimation of the
state and is also composed by two equations: project the state ahead B.4:
xˆ−k = Axˆk−1 +Buk (B.4)
Where A is the transition Matrix of the difference equation, x the state vector, B is the
input matrix and u the input control. Project the error covariance ahead B.5:
P−k = APk−1A
T +Q (B.5)
Where P is the covariance matrix, A the transition matrix and Q is the covariance
matrix of the noise introduced by uk.
B.2 measurement update or correct
The phase of measurement update uses the data collected to actualize the kalman filter
and is composed by 3 different equations: Compute the Kalman GainB.6:
Kk = P
−
k H
T
(
HP−k H
T +R
)−1
(B.6)
Where K is the Kalman filter gain and H is the matrix relating the state and the
measurement, R is the covariance matrix of measurements.
Update estimate with measurement Zk B.7
Xˆk = Xˆ
−
k +Kk
(
Zk −HXˆ−k
)
(B.7)
Update the error covariance B.8:
Pk = (I −KkH)P−k (B.8)
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•Project state 
 
•Project covariance
Compute Kalman Gain
•Update Estimate with Z
•Update error covariance
Time Update
“Predict”
Measurement Update
“Correct”
x̂k
-=A ̂x k−1
P k
-=AP k−1 A
TQ
K k=P k
- HT (HP k- H T+PYk)
-1
X̂ k= X̂ k
-+K k (Y k−H X̂ k- )
Pk= I−K k H  Pk-
H, P
Y
A,Q
X, P
Y
Figure B.1: Kalman Filter Structure
B.3 Kalman filter formulation
Let Y (k), H(k) and X(k) be the vectors and matrix of equation (B.2) at sampling
instant k and Xˆ(k) the best estimator for X(k). A Kalman filtering consists to firstly
predict the state vector of the next time sampling. For our application, we choose the
following conventional model:
Xˆ−(k) = A(k − 1)Xˆ(k − 1)
P−(k) = A(k − 1)PXˆ(k−1)AT (k − 1) +Q(k − 1)
(B.9)
where the first equation depicts how the prediction of the states (Xˆ−) is done, by
means of a transition matrix (A) which contains some information of the dynamics of
the mobile. On the other hand, the second equation models the covariance matrix of
this prediction in function of the covariance matrix of the states estimation (PXˆ) and
the process noise (Q). As a second step, an update of the state vector estimation (Xˆ)
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is performed by taking into account the previous estimation and a new set of obser-
vations (Y ) with a measure covariance matrix of (PY ). The Kalman filter minimises
the weighted sum of the squares of the estimation errors, where the weights of each
variable are given according to the inverse of the noise variance of the variable (141).
Thus, the best estimation of X(k) is given by:
Xˆ(k) = Xˆ−(k) +K(k)
[
Y (k)−H(k)Xˆ−(k)
]−1
(B.10)
where the so called Kalman gain is written as:
K(k) = P−(k)HT (k)[H(k)P−(k)HT (k) + PY (k)]−1 (B.11)
Finally, the covariance matrix of the last state vector estimation can be updated as
PXˆ(k) = [I −K(k)H(k)]P−(k) (B.12)
and and the whole process is iteratively repeated by performing a new prediction.
For the sake of simplicity, the time dependency k will be dropped from the notation
from now on, in the cases that a confusion is not possible. Figure B.1 summarizes
the KF process where the estimation of the state vector and its associated covariance
matrix is computed at each iteration of the filter in function of the measurements
and the associated updates on the measurement noise and geometry (or measurement)
matrix.
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Statistics is the first of the inexact sciences.
Edmond de Goncourt(1822 1896)
C
Statistical distributions
C.1 χ2 Distribution
If Z1, ..., Zk. are independent, standard normal random variables, the sum of their
squares,
Q =
k∑
i=0
Z2i (C.1)
is distributed according to the chi-squared (χ2) distribution with k degrees of free-
dom. This is usually denoted as in eq. C.2, where the parameter k indicates the number
of degrees of freedom (i.e: the number of independent variables which squares are being
summed).
Q ∼ χ2k (C.2)
C.1.1 χ2 Probability Density Function
The Probability Density Function (PDF) of the χ2 distribution is defined by eq. C.3.
f(x; k) =
{
1
2k/2Γ(k/2)
xk/2−1e−x/2, x ≥ 0;
0, otherwise
(C.3)
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where Γ(k/2) denotes the Gamma function, which has closed-form values at the
half integers
Γ(n) =
{
Γ(n+ 1) = n!, n ∈ N;
Γ
(
1
2n
)
=
√
pi (n−2)!!
2(n−1)/2 ,
(C.4)
Applying eq. C.4, to some significant numbers representing the must usual degrees
of freedom in χ2, the obtained Γ values are:
• k=1, Γ(12) =
√
pi ≈ 1.7724538509055160273
• k=2, Γ(1) = 1
• k=3, Γ(13) = 12
√
pi ≈ 0.8862269254527580137
• k=4, Γ(2) = 1
C.1.2 χ2 Cumulative Distribution Function
The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of χ2 is defined as:
F (x; k) =
γ(k/2, x/2)
Γ(k/2)
= P (k/2, x/2) (C.5)
where γ(k, z) is the lower incomplete Gamma function and P (k, z) is the regularized
Gamma function. For the special case of k = 2 the CDF of χ2 has a simple form:
F (x; 2) = 1− e−x2 (C.6)
C.2 Rayleigh Distribution
The wide field of application of the χ2 distribution, motivates the refinement into more
specific distributions.
The combination of two variables is specially interesting in navigation as the prob-
lem could be formulated adapted to the existing cartography (e.g: Latitude and Lon-
gitude or North and East) but some magnitudes shall be observed as a combination of
the selected magnitudes (e.g: cross track error or along the track error).
One continuous probability distribution very often observed when the overall mag-
nitude of a vector depends on their 2 dimensions orthogonal components is the Rayleigh
distribution.
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C.2.1 Rayleigh Probability Density Function
The Probability Density Function (PDF) of the Rayleigh distribution is defined by eq.
C.3.
f(x;σ) =
x
σ2
e−x
2/2σ2 (C.7)
C.2.2 Rayleigh Cumulative Distribution Function
The Rayleigh Distribution has a CDF defined by equation C.8.
F (x) = 1− e−x2/2σ2 (C.8)
CDF has an intrinsic value in itself as it shows the statistical probability that a
measure has as a maximum the value of x. Nevertheless, sometimes we must ensure
that the value of the observed magnitude (x) should be under a determinate value with
a determinate confidence percentage (F (x)) e.g: 95% of the time. Taking the CDF
eq.C.8 and isolating x at the right we obtain eq. C.9
F (x)− 1 = −e−x2/2σ2 ⇒ 1− F (x) = e−x2/2σ2 ⇒ (C.9)
applying ln to eq. C.9 and simplifying eq. C.10 is obtained
⇒ ln (1− F (x)) = ln
(
e−x
2/2σ2
)
⇒ ln (1− F (x)) = −x2/2σ2 (C.10)
multiplying eq. C.10 by −2σ2 and simplifying results in eq. C.11
⇒ ln (1− F (x)) 2σ2 = −x2 ⇒ −ln (1− F (x)) 2σ2 = x2 (C.11)
making the
√
eq eq. C.11 by −2σ2 and simplifying finally results in eq. C.12
⇒ x =
√
−ln (1− F (x)) 2σ2 ⇒ x =
√
−2ln (1− F (x))σ (C.12)
Once isolated the x, the confidence intervals could be calculated. Some interesting
confidence intervals (values of F (x)) in aviation are:
• Accuracy F (x) = 0.95, reached for x ≈ 2, 4477σ
• Integrity F (x) = 1− 10−7, reached for x ≈ 5, 6777σ
• F (x) = 1− 10−9, reached for x ≈ 6, 4379σ
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Distrust is the mother of safety.
Aristophanes (446 BC c. 386 BC)
D
Protection Level
To provide a confidence interval that guarantees the accuracy of the error should be
taken into account that the error as defined by ICAO is not an aleatory variable but
a combination of two (x, y). The combination of two aleatory variable normally dis-
tributed results in a Rayleigh distribution whose characteristics could be consulted in
section C.2.
Figure D.1 provides a graphical interpretation of the content of Matrix P as re-
trieved from the Extended Kalman Filter. It provides a measure of the uncertainty in
the estimation of the positioning. This estimation is obtained as a combination of the
different measures covariances employed by the EKF.
These covariances have been obtaining by estimating the solution of minimum co-
variance and the covariance itself, reflects a weighted linear combination of the covari-
ances of the measures. This linear combination does not reflects the geometry of the
solution and the effect that the measure covariances could have with different geome-
tries.
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Figure D.1: Covariance Matrix P Geometric Interpretation
D.1 Dilution of Precision
This problem is also present in the GPS positioning where is used the concept of
Dilution Of Precision (DOP) for better estimating the confidence that the positioning
could give (see (123)). Considering that the different sources of error as independent,
then can be root-sum-square to obtain a value for σ. This value is known in GPS as
User Equivalent Range Error (UERE). Then the UERE to be applied for each measure
of distance from a emitter i is the sum of all the covariances of individual source of
158
D.1 Dilution of Precision
error (see eq. D.1)
σ2i = σ
2
clki
+ σ2clkr + σ
2
vi + σ
2
vr (D.1)
Once defined the covariance for each measure as the square of the UERE, the cal-
culation of the minimum covariance solution with the Kalman Filter requires a weights
matrix as defined as in eq. D.2
W =

1/σ21 0 . . . 0
0 1/σ22 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 1/σ2n
 (D.2)
The Covariances used in Matrix W belongs to the measures, but for estimating how
these errors affects to the final positioning shall be employed the law of propagation of
error as indicated in eq. D.3.
(
HT ·W ·H)−1 =

d2east den deu det
den d
2
north dnu dnt
deu dnu d
2
up dut
det dnt dut d
2
time
 (D.3)
HDOP =
√
d2east + d
2
north (D.4)
V DOP =
√
d2up (D.5)
D.1.1 Vertical Dilution of Precision
To take advantage of higher locations for Receiver stations, the optimal solution is to
locate them far enough to distribute its uncertainty parallel to the flight, which occurs
when the high location is at an infinite distance.
Fig. D.2 shows the geometry of the high elevation locations for receiver stations. For
an infinite value of h, the a becomes 0 and the uncertainty of its measure is propagated
over the horizontal plane. Diminishing h, the a increases at the same time that the
uncertainty component on the vertical axe increases. In the other hand a equals to 0,
for an infinite value of d, the vertical uncertainty becomes a wall from the ground to
the sky.
Fig. D.3 shows the effect of having Rx stations located at hight, but below the
optimal elevation. Being the Receiver station aligned with the altitude of flight, the
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Figure D.3: Uncertainties with Rx at high locations
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Figure D.4: Elevated Rx reduction of Radius
uncertainties areas becomes more and more vertical increasing the uncertainty in the
vertical axe without improving the measurement in the horizontal plane.
The reason behind this displacement on the target altitude is that the system is en-
visaged for detecting helicopters flying under the approved flight altitude and therefore,
the error must be contained at the flight altitude of the offender helicopters.
The proposed geometry condition the location of the Receiver stations. Fig. D.5
shows the geometry of the worst geometry for measuring the z component, just in the
middle of two Rx stations.
Approaching any of the Rx Stations produces an uncertainty area more and more
horizontal that compensates the uncertainty area produced by the reception of the
signal in the farest Rx station that becomes progressively more and more vertical. At
this point the Line of Sight of Rx1 and Rx2 must be at an angle of 90. As the height of
the intersection between lines of Sight and the trajectories (hi) is known and the angle
of the line of Sight with the horizontal plane could be calculated to be 45, the distance
between the Rx and the projection of the intersection point over the horizontal plane
becomes as indicated in D.6
Fig. D.5 shows the effect over the distance between the vertical projection of the air
vehicle and the receiver stations of elevating the receiver station location keeping the
alpha value constant. For an alpha value of 45 each additional meter in the elevation of
the receiver must be compensated by approaching 1meter the receiver to the intersection
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Figure D.5: Optimal Separation of Rx Stations
point.
di =
hi
tan(α)
(D.6)
With the formulation of the distance between receiver station and intersection point
expressed in Fig. D.5, the separation between receiver stations at MSL correspond
with the target flight altitude multiplied by 2 for an alpha value of 45. Accepting alpha
values of 30, the reduction of the separation could be limited .
The convenience or not of increasing the number of stations (and its associated
cost) to achieve the increment is a client decision, but seems difficult to justify such an
increment in the cost for a so small improvement in the accuracy.
D.2 Adequation to ICAOs error definitions
Eq. D.3 gives at the diagonal the covariances at each component (east and north in 2D)
and the correlation outside the diagonal. This is interesting when the magnitude ob-
served is expressed in the same reference frame but the ICAO defined navigation errors
(see at section E) are defined with a trajectory based frame instead of a geographical
frame. To adequate the protection level to the error definitions of ICAO, it is applied
the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to find the direction of maximum variance.
After applying PCA to the covariance Matrix defined in eq.D.3, the direction with the
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biggest value has a σ defined as in eq.D.7.
dmajor =
√√√√d2east + d2north
2
+
√(
d2east − d2north
2
)2
+ d2en (D.7)
Once computed the applicable σ in eq. D.7, the horizontal protection level could
be easily computed (see eq. D.8) by multiplying the dmajor by a constant K to obtain
the desired percentage. This constant value K is obtained from the Rayleigh CDF (see
eq. C.12) for the different percentages desired:
• K ≈ 2, 4477 for a confidence interval of 95%
• K ≈ 5, 6777 for a confidence interval of 1− 10−7.
• K ≈ 6, 4379 for a confidence interval of 1− 10−9.
HPL = K · dmajor (D.8)
Shall be kept in mind that the HPL calculated in eq.D.8 represents an upper bound
for the σ of the positioning error as the considered error depends on the direction of
the trajectory (ect and eat) whilst the estimated HPL depends on the geometry of the
different measures employed.
The expected placement of the network users in a very narrow interval of vertical
positions in relation with the larger horizontal positions makes unrealistic the calcula-
tion of a Vertical Protection Level (VPL) unless for very limited scenarios as landing or
Take Off. Consequently, Vertical Dilution of Precision (VDOP) is not further developed
in this section.
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Everything approaches everything,
with more or less error.
Anonymous
E
ICAO Positioning Errors
Whilst the intuition could drive to consider the euclidean distance as the appropriated
method for calculating the error between the actual position of the aircraft and the
calculated navigation position of the aircraft, the characteristics of the air traffic drive
to a different methodology.
Figure E.1 shows the relation between the ICAO defined trajectory errors and the
Euclidean distance. Euclidean Distance (deuclidean) weights equally the longitudinal
error along the trajectory with the lateral error besides the trajectory and even with
the vertical error. Whilst the error along the trajectory (eat) could be assimilated in
the real world with delays in the time of arrival or with advancements (not so often
as the other case), the lateral error (ect) could be assimilated with an abandonment of
the trajectory and the vertical error could be assimilated to a flight level invasion. In
both lateral and vertical errors considerations that could lead to accidents.
This different risk associated to the different errors is reflected in the methodology
employed by ICAO in its Performance Based Navigation Manual (47) where the error
considered for the lateral error is the minimum distance from the actual point A to the
trajectory T .
165
E. ICAO POSITIONING ERRORS
15
ect
eat
d euclidian
Figure E.1: ICAO defined trajectory errors
E.1 Distance from a Point to a line
For a straight trajectory T expressed as in eq. E.1 the distance from the actual position
could be calculated applying eq. E.2.
a · x+ b · y + c = 0 (E.1)
d(A, T ) =
|a · x+ b · y + c|√
a2 + b2
(E.2)
With a line expressed with a reduced formulation (see eq.E.3), the equation to be
applied for the calculation of the distance between point and the trajectory could be
simplified as in eq. E.4.
y = a · x+ b (E.3)
d(A, T ) =
|a · xA − yA + b|√
a2 + 1
(E.4)
The slope of a stright line could be calculated from two points of the line with the
eq. E.5.
m =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 (E.5)
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An alternative method to obtain the slope of the straight line is using the director
vector (vx, vy) as presented in eq. E.6 instead of two different points. This option is
specially interesting for simulations where the flight attitude is available as it could be
performed without maintaining a log of the positions.
m =
vy
vx
(E.6)
Once calculated the slope of the line (with eq. E.5 or eq. E.6), the equation of a
line containing a point (x1, y1) could be retrieved applying eq. E.7.
y − y1 = m(x− x1) (E.7)
E.2 Vector equations
Another way to formalise the trajectory of the aircraft is employing the vectorial form
of the straight line. The equ. E.8 show the Vectorial form of a straight line equation.
It is composed by a parameter λ that multiplies a vector ~V that provides the direction
of the line and a point P0 contained in the line.
P = λ~V + P0 (E.8)
This vectorial form has the advantage of using directly magnitudes available on the
simulation. The attitude of the aircraft could be employed for the vector ~V as well as
the position is available for point P0.
~V1 =
(
vx1
vy1
)
~V2 =
( −vy1
vx1
)
(E.9)
A simple method to obtain two orthogonal lines equations is to develop from to
orthogonal vectors. Eq. E.9 show a simple method to obtain a orthogonal vector to
another in the plane, changing the component and the sign of one of them.
The definition of Cross track error (see eq E.10) by ICAO consider the minimum
distance from the simulated point to the trajectory T . This minimum distance between
a point and a line is the distance between the estimated point Pe and the intersection
point Pi between the trajectory and a orthogonal line that contains the estimated
position.
ect = d(Pe, T ) = d(Pe, Pi) (E.10)
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The definition of Along the Track error by ICAO (see eq E.11) is the distance
between Pi and the actual position on the trajectory Pa.
eat = d(Pa, Pi) (E.11)
Pi could be calculated by a system of lineal equations (see eq. E.12)representing
the trajectory of the aircraft and a orthogonal line.
eat = d(Pa, Pi) (E.12)
{
Pi = λa
−→
VT + Pa
Pi = λe
−→
V + Pe
{
λa
−→
VT + Pa = λe
−→
V + Pe (E.13)
{
λa
(
VTx
VTy
)
+
(
Pax
Pay
)
= λe
(
Vx
Vy
)
+
(
Pex
Pey
)
(E.14)
Applying eq. E.9 to eq. E.14 results in eq.E.15{
λa
(
VTx
VTy
)
+
(
Pax
Pay
)
= λe
( −VTy
VTx
)
+
(
Pex
Pey
)
(E.15)
{
λaVTx + Pax = λe − VTy + Pex
λaVTy + Pay = λeVTx + Pey
{
λaVTx + Pax = −λeVTy + Pex
λaVTy + Pay = λeVTx + Pey
(E.16)
{
VTx
VTy
(λaVTx + Pax) =
VTx
VTy
(−λeVTy + Pex)
λaVTy + Pay = λeVTx + Pey
(E.17)
{
λa
V 2Tx
VTy
+ Pax
VTx
VTy
= −λeVTx + Pex VTxVTy
λaVTy + Pay = λeVTx + Pey
(E.18)
{
λa
V 2Tx
VTy
+ Pax
VTx
VTy
+ λaVTy + Pay = Pex
VTx
VTy
+ Pey (E.19)
{
λa
V 2Tx
VTy
+ λaVTy = Pex
VTx
VTy
− Pax
VTx
VTy
+ Pey − Pay (E.20)
{
λa
(
V 2Tx
VTy
+ VTy
)
=
VTx
VTy
(Pex − Pax) + Pey − Pay (E.21)
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{
λa
V 2Tx + V
2
Ty
VTy
=
VTx
VTy
(Pex − Pax) + Pey − Pay (E.22)
{
λa =
VTy
V 2Tx + V
2
Ty
(
VTx
VTy
(Pex − Pax) + Pey − Pay
)
(E.23)
{
λa =
VTx (Pex − Pax)
V 2Tx + V
2
Ty
+ Pey
VTy
V 2Tx + V
2
Ty
− Pay
VTy
V 2Tx + V
2
Ty
(E.24)
{
λa =
VTx (Pex − Pax)
V 2Tx + V
2
Ty
+
VTy
(
Pey − Pay
)
V 2Tx + V
2
Ty
(E.25)
{
λa =
VTx (Pex − Pax) + VTy
(
Pey − Pay
)
V 2Tx + V
2
Ty
(E.26)
VTx ≈ 0
{
Pax = −λeVTy + Pex
λaVTy + Pay = +Pey
 λe =
Pax−Pex
−VTy
λa =
Pey−Pay
VTy
(E.27)
VTy ≈ 0
{
λaVTx + Pax = Pex
Pay = λeVTx + Pey
{
λa =
Pex−Pax
VTx
λe =
Pay−Pey
VTx
(E.28)
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It was the best of times,
it was the worst of times.
Charles Dickens, (1812 1870)
Sorry officer,
you mean before in time or in space?
Airbag, Spanish movie (1997)
F
Clock Model
The Range measuring assumed for the relative navigation (see chapter 6) and surveil-
lance (see chapter 7) are based on the synchronization of the clocks of the different
users. The different mechanism to achieve this synchronization are not part of this
PhD assuming as valid the synchronization values of the literature.
The achievable synchronization has some limits that affect the positioning solution,
no matter if it is a surveillance or a navigation performance, the range measurement will
have an error as explained in section 4.4.1.1. This measuring error could be increased
at the positioning solution by the effect of the DoP as explained in section D.1.
A realistic assessment of the positioning solution requires then the to modelling
of the behaviour of the clock onboard the different users. Being the time measuring
a complex discipline, the requirements set for a clock model are quite reduced when
considering the error in synchronism as the observed magnitude, which is the main
magnitude when using the clock for range measuring. Figure F.1 shows the model
simulated to achieve realistic values of the synchronism error using a reduced set of
parameters:
• Clock Accuracy CAc
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σ A
C Ac
C Ag
Figure F.1: Simulated Clock Model
• Aging CAg
• Allan deviation σA
The Clock accuracy is assumed as the deviation from the expected value.I.e: the
deviation with respect to the common clock, which in the case of the simulations is the
GPS clock. This magnitude is offered as the RMS of the values. It is simulated as a
gaussian value of 0 mean and RMS Value of 100ns assigned to each clock at the init of
the simulation.
The Aging of the clock is the trend to be delayed or advanced. Usually is offered in
ns/24h, but for the case of high accuracy atomic clocks is often offered as the number of
billion years required to be delayed one second. It is simulated as a factor multiplying
the current time, the result is added to the Initial accuracy value.
The Allan deviation of the time is a measure of the stability in the time measuring.
It represents the deviation between two measures in a time period. It is the square root
of the Allan Variance which is also offered as measure of stability. It is simulated as a
gaussian value of 0 mean and using the Allan Variance as the Standard deviation.
Then Synchronism error is simulated as expressed by eq F.1:
εsynch = CAc + CAg + σA (F.1)
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